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Abstract 
 
This thesis discusses the theoretical implications Lacanian psychoanalysis may have on any 
articulation of historical experience. It takes as its starting point the Lacanian dictum that “the 
big Other does not exist”, and then attempts to find a way that allows us to go beyond historicist 
discursive regimes diagnosing these regimes as a refusal to accept the nonexistence of the big 
Other. The research focuses as well on the discourse of being Heidegger articulated in Being and 
Time, and how its “failure” may be read from a Lacanian perspective. It is here that the discourse 
of being is opposed to the discourse of jouissance and what Lacan later called Le Sinthome. 
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Chapter 1 
The Barred Other 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 Walter Benjamin said that historical experience proper begins when we observe an object 
that is no longer part of our culture because it has been taken over by nature1. What results from 
this disjunction, between that which was previously embedded in our economies of desire and 
their  remainders, is perhaps an image of the destiny of desire and even of desiring beings. 
Consequently, the natural process of erosion that takes over the object of desire is certainly not 
posterior to its being propped up by culture. For what gnaws at cultural objects is the essence of 
all objects, i.e. they are destined to fail, as Lacan points out2. One could add “to fail their cause” 
on the condition that insofar as they are objects of reality, i.e. of desire operating in fantasy, they 
are not caused by this failure; rather, they are ‘there’ only because their place is there; that is to 
say, where they are given a relational position to other objects. But insofar as they are objects at 
all, and this is a dimension of desire’s perpetual dissatisfaction, they can only continue to fail to 
be an object. In this latter sense, their cause is nothing but the mapping out of their failure. In 
other words, causes have effects not because of a process of insemanation3, but because they are 
searched for. From a Lacanian view, if an object thrown out of culture and left to erode under the 
sun symbolizes anything, then it is not the result of the symbol’s failure to completely kill the 
                                               
1 Walter Benjamin, Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings. Vol. 4, 1938-1940 (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard UP, 2003), 96. 
 
2 “The object is a failure. The essence of the object is failure”. Jacques Lacan, Encore: On 
Feminine Sexuality: The Limits of Love and Knowledge (New York: Norton, 1998), 58. 
 
3 Emanation+Insemination. (My neologism). 
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thing, but rather the spittle of the operation of the signifier itself, insofar as it is there that desire 
is articulated. It is the supplementary materiality of the signifier, an extra one4. 
 Lacan’s analytic discourse also aims at approaching history by way of a disjunction: “The 
aim of my teaching...is to dissociate a and A by reducing the first to what is related to the 
imaginary and the second to what is related to the symbolic...And yet, a has lent itself to be 
confused with S (A)...and it has done so by means of the function of being. It is here that a 
scission or detachment remains to be effectuated”5. By a Lacan means the image that is formed 
around the real the void that causes desire. It is what plugs the lack of being in fantasy and on the 
basis of which a sexual relation is inscribed. The object a6 is the object invented by the subject 
that stands for the fact of desire maintains itself only through its dissatisfaction. If one wants to 
represent desire by a vector, then object a is not ahead of desire, an unmoved mover that desire 
can never reach by virtue of its metonymy. As Jacques-Alain Miller points out, it is rather 
‘before’ the vector, in other words, closer to the subject than the vector itself7. Moreover, the A 
stands for the Other8 in so far as the latter is the locus of speech. For Lacan, for whom no 
                                               
4 Jacques-Alain Miller, “Mathemes”, Lacan: Topologically Speaking (New York: Other, 2004), 
29. 
 
5 Lacan, Encore, 83. 
 
6 The unsurpassable gap between the unconscious object cause of desire, the “IT”, and the 
empirical object embodying it is the reason behind desire’s eternal dissatisfaction. The little a, 
therefore, stands in opposition to the transcendent symbolic order. The former is at the core of 
the reflexivity that is characteristic of the ego. See Lacan, “The Subversion of the Subject,” 
Écrits, 701. 
 
7 Miller, “Mathemes”, 31. 
 
8 The Other for Lacan is initially the trans-individual locus of speech, the network of linguistic 
and symbolic structures ruling over the interactions between speaking beings. The unconscious is 
therefore the discourse of the Other since the subject’s speech is predominately determined by an 
Other that cannot be reduced to imaginary identification. The incompleteness of such an 
“objective spirit” was later represented by Lacan through the symbol A, the barred Other. The 
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metalanguage exists, A is the place that is simultaneously posited with the act of enunciation, 
with lack. That is why A is barred. It is the jouissance9 of this barred A, which Lacan calls 
feminine jouissance, that results once object a is separated from its image, which ensnares the 
speaking being in his suffering. It is from the locus of the Other as barred that approaching the 
facticity of existence cannot be read as totally idiotic; rather, the jouissance of the barred Other is 
the constitutive point of exception to phallic jouissance. For if the Other is the place, the locus, of 
combinatives where we are duped by jouissance, then one can intervene in history only if one 
stands in that place according to which all other forms of jouissance are decadent substitutes. In 
other words, approaching human existence in its historical dimension is a question of jouissance 
first and foremost. It is from the point of view of the jouissance, repression, and the lack of 
being, that is to say, from the criterion and limits that are imposed on and by the jouissance of 
the Other, that one can say something about how historical discourses are condemned to deal 
with the same barred A, even if they do not confront it directly. Otherwise what one will see in 
the Other (and for Lacan there is no Other but the Other sex) is only one’s own image. In such a 
situation, one will see only objects of desire so to speak, and fail to take the signifier in its 
liberating function, i.e. as that which allows a reference beyond human existence, or beyond the 
Symbolic.  
                                                                                                                                                       
barring of the symbolic Other means that real Other, as a traumatic encounter, is eminent to the 
structure of subjectivity. 
 
9 Jouissance for Lacan is fundamentally transgressive in relation to the pleasure principle. 
Whereas the latter is a function of homeostasis and a telos of pleasure, jouissance is beyond the 
pleasure principle, it is suffering and a pleasure in pain. A renunciation of jouissance is thus 
correlate with entering the symbolic order, and the jouissance that operates on the gaps and 
failures of the big Other is phallic jouissance. Feminine jouissance is Lacan’s attempt to 
articulate a non-transgressive jouissance that is related to the Other in non-symbolic way. See 
Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959-1960: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book 
VII (Norton, New York, 1997), 184.  
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 The question, however, of effecting such a disjunction between a and S(A) remains a 
difficult one. Not simply because truth is not propositional, in other words, that one can repeat to 
infinity that ‘desire sustains itself through its dissatisfaction’ without any change in the habits, 
“the fundamental habit of the mind”10 as Lacan calls it, taking place, but also because even after 
traversing the fundamental fantasy and the realization of the nonexistence of the big Other, the 
subject is left with its object a, its cause of desire, insisting at the points where the real irrupts 
into the symbolic. Because of this deadlock, Lacan elaborated his notion of the sinthome11 as a 
new articulation of the subject’s relation to object a. It is in the sinthome that the extra 
materiality of the signifier is worked out in a form of writing that takes the letter literally, a form 
of writing that Lacan thought is best represented by the writing of James Joyce. 
 
 It is thus on the basis of these topological mathemes S(A) and a, the object cause of 
desire, that we will attempt to articulate the position from which psychoanalysis can say 
something about historical experience. First, we shall try to explicate Lacan’s aphorism “there is 
no Other of the Other”12. Here the consequences of the subject’s direct contact with the real will 
be elaborated in relation to the decline of the Oedipus father, or rather that there never was an 
Oedipus structure except in Freud’s dreams. Lacan’s re-thinking of increasing status of the 
plurality of the names-of-the-father in relation to the structure of disavowal and perversion will 
                                               
10 Lacan, Encore, 105. 
 
11 Lacan later introduced the term sinthome as a way of organizing one’s jouissance that is 
‘beyond’ the efficacy of the symbolic order. Whereas the symptom was initially a signifier, the 
sinthome is a new articulation of the symptom as unanalysable. The task of the analyst does not 
so much become a task of deciphering signifiers according to an unconscious message, but 
helping the subject identifies with his sinthome as a modality of jouissance. See Dylan Evans, An 
Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (London: Routledge, 1996), 191. 
 
12 Jacques Lacan, Écrits: The First Complete Edition In English (New York: Norton, 1998), 688. 
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be discussed. A brief section on the letter and its function as a messenger of the jouissance of 
“whoever makes use of it” will be also included. The significance of the letter comes in as a 
consequence of the relativization of the name(s)-of-the-father and its particularization in the 
structure of perversion. Since the subject can only instantiate the name-of-the-father in his\her 
particular Other due to the subject’s direct contact with the real, the letter is an attempt to rethink 
this relation with the real outside of the symbolic law. Second, there will be section on the 
semblance and its relation to the baroque as effecting the separation of the imaginary 
identification, a, from the S(A) through the void that sustains the image. Here an account of the 
function of being and being-there as dependent on object a, and consequently, on semblance, 
will be discussed.  Third, a full chapter then will be devoted to a close reading of Heidegger’s 
Being and Time, reading, that is, defined in the Lacanian sense of being “the signifier of 
demand”13. In other words, it is a perverted reading, and consequently subversive, that will, so to 
speak, “push reality back into fantasy” by reading ‘Dasein is always mine’ to the letter. Such a 
reading, therefore, will have absolutely nothing to do with the jouissance of being-there, since 
here a is coalesced with S(A)14, and traces, perversely, the contours where sense points towards 
the direction of its failure. A discourse of being can only lend itself to the confusion of S(A) with 
a. Following the logic of the symbolic to the end means here an attempt to anchor the phallus in 
the real, and what articulation provides a better template than the so-called transcendental 
schemata? (This is because the schemata are by definition an attempt to connect two 
                                               
13Véronique Voruz, “The Topology of the Subject of the Law: the Nullibiquity of the Fictional 
Fifth,” Lacan: Topologically Speaking (New York: Other), 290. 
 
14 Lacan contends that “a has lent itself to be confused with S(A)…by means of the function of 
being”, Encore, 83. In other words, a reading which does not presume to grasp the transcendence 
being is supposed to bestow. The conflation between transcendence and reality results in a 
reading that maps out the discourse of the master, the discourse of the unconscious, insofar as the 
latter is indexed by S1. 
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heterogeneous elements.) This shall demonstrate Lacan’s contention that being-there is present 
only in the semblance and is exclusively a function of the object cause of desire. Finally, we 
shall return to the sinthome as an attempt to write the support of the Borromean knot, to the 
sinthome that knots itself between the real and the imaginary, “the self-image that envelops the 
object cause of desire”15, as a way of articulating an “ego-like’ dimension as an alternative to the 
symbolic name-of-the-father. This articulation of the sinthome is perhaps a way to reorient the 
perverse tyranny of the superego, since a decline of the function of the father means the subject 
no longer finds it easy to accept castration. Consequently, the sinthome is also closely related to 
the perverse plurality of the names-of-the-father in our contemporary subjectivity and its 
correlate of one’s particular Other. This shift has occurred because, in so far as ‘Dasein is always 
mine’ is concerned, the da, the function of being, is pushed towards the real, twisted, and 
reorganized. 
 
1.2 No Other of the Other 
 
 It was Lacan’s theorization, in the 1960’s and 1970’s, of the notion of the real and its 
intimate presence in the other registers of the symbolic and the imaginary that ultimately 
distanced him radically from phenomenology. For example, in the 1938 text of “Les complexes 
familiaux,” he defines the task of psychoanalysis in unmistakably phenomenological terms. The 
aim of psychoanalysis, he writes, is to “consider all experience lived before any objectification as 
                                               
15 Lacan, Encore, 92. 
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well as before any reflexive analysis that mixes objectification with experience”16. One can 
clearly see the affinity this statement bears to the philosophical tradition of phenomenology: not 
only the most decisive feature of the psychoanalytic project lies in an anti-objectifying gesture, 
one might say an attempt to untangle the metaphysico-grammatical prejudices of philosophy and 
language, so too does an implicit privilege of a zero-level passivity that precedes the reflexive 
machinery of consciousness. One might say that lived experience is opened, initially, 
primordially, to a “pure percipi” that is constantly obfuscated, blurred by the objectifying capture 
of the ego in an image17. If one takes into account only this early Lacan of the imaginary then 
that task of philosophy (and of psychoanalysis) is to liquidate the imaginary fixations of the ego 
and prepare it to enter into a dialectic....of what? Of the figure of the big Other. Teresa Brennan 
exemplifies this logic and its consequences in her book History After Lacan, where she places 
the emphasis of the fundamental fantasy in the imaginary register. The obstacle to re-writing the 
past is in the ossifying ego, a process which has its origins in the foundational fantasy. Beyond 
appearances, which are the result of the ego’s objectifying drive which reduces the “lively 
heterogeneous difference” to a scale of greyness, resides the source from which the symbolic 
must be re-written18. This source lies beyond the homogeneity of the ego, and we could add, is 
the phenomenological site of “pure percipi”, pure difference as it is presented passively to the 
subject before the machinery of the ego colonizes it and transforms it into a piece within the 
hegemonic symbolic apparatus. 
                                               
16 Quoted in Lorenzo Chiesa. Subjectivity and Otherness: A Philosophical Reading of Lacan 
(London: MIT press, 2007), 26. 
 
17 Ibid, 27. 
 
18 Teresa Brennan, History after Lacan (London: Routledge, 1993), 36. 
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 It is only with Lacan’s later elaboration of the real that the image is no longer perceived 
as an unwanted obstacle that must be gotten rid of, purely and simply. The image now points to 
the non-existence of any figure of the big Other by virtue of a little object a that resides both in 
the subject nor in the Other. Thus in Seminar VII Lacan says that “man, too, is interesting for the 
hollow the image leaves empty- by reason of the fact that one does not see in the image, beyond 
the capture of the image, the emptiness of God to be discovered”19. There is something in the 
image that is more than the image itself, something that cannot fit the dialectic of specularity that 
ultimately ossifies the ego. This something is the “real remainder, a void that resides at the 
frontier between the Imaginary and the Real”20. Whereas it might very well be true that the fault 
in postmodernism, according to Brennan, is that “it refuses to identify any source of this egoistic 
homogeneity”21 (one might say a lack of theorization of the fall of Dasein into the Das Man finds 
its elaboration in psychoanalytic identification), yet it is not the case that this simple lack of 
theory, once amended, will lead to the same conclusion, to the same place phenomenological 
reflection defines as prior to reflexivity. In other words, the gap, the cut, which, according to 
Lacan, situates the unconscious (and thus gives psychoanalysis a space to enter into dialogue 
with philosophy, as opposed to the unconscious being the non-accessible irrational part of the 
psyche that forever threatens philosophy by virtue of the latter’s dependence on consciousness) 
is not to be located in a primordial receptivity to the sensuous manifold22. Any symbolic 
                                               
19Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959-1960: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book 
VII (Norton, New York, 1997), 196.  
 
20 Chiesa, 106. 
 
21 Brennan, 36. 
 
22 Heidegger always remained loyal to this attitude of passivity, exemplified in the inaugural 
gesture of phenomenology “to the things themselves”. In his reading of Kant, he always searched 
for that passivity that precedes the incorporation of the sensuous manifold into the a priori 
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interconnections that are veiled to the rigid ego would amount to no more than another figure of 
the big Other, no matter how much emphasis is laid on their heterogeneity. The theorization of 
the real as a hollow in the image puts the subject in direct contact with the real. One could say, 
according to the logic of the signifier, that Brennan’s emphasis on dislodging the ego in order to 
allow the heterogeneity of things to manifest itself risks treating the real as originally one, 
whereas in fact the real was no-thing before it was holed by the signifier23.  Claims of pre-
symbolic heterogeneity, no matter how radical, still fail to accept, and draw the full 
consequences of, the fact that there is no Other of the Other.  
  Now things get interesting: how should we read “there is no Other of the Other”, or in its 
other formulation, “the big Other does not exist”? More importantly, are these two statements the 
same? I think an important distinction must be drawn between them. The first denies the 
existence of a transcendent entity that governs the network of signifiers, or, since reality for 
Lacan is ultimately governed by the signifier, the phenomenal realm of causality, to use a 
Kantian term. To use Alenka Zupančič’s words: “no Other of the Other, no Cause behind the 
cause”24. Whereas the second statement (“the big Other does not exist”) seems to imply more 
radical consequences. It appears to forbid any transcendence whatsoever. One might claim, it is a 
sort of a skeptical statement in which the subject is forever barred from ascertaining anything his 
                                                                                                                                                       
concepts. One of the consequences Lacan draws from the non-existence of the big Other is that 
the “to things themselves” is but a fantasm, in other words, the real thing-in-itself is no-thing, 
l’achose.  
 
23 See Chiesa, 121. 
 
24 Alenka Zupančič, Ethics of the Real: Kant, Lacan (London: Verso, 2000), 40. 
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own “anticipated image- which he had caught of himself in his mirror-coming to meet him”25. In 
fact, one can even postulate the hypothesis that Lacan’s two statements, before and after his 
kehre, are a response and a solution to the same question: How is history possible? Why do 
things happen at the level of the symbolic, imaginary, and the real? How do societies function? 
Or to put it more aphoristically, how do people not go mad? If desire has no object (in the sense 
of reality), but only an object-cause, then is not human desire, insofar as it is stolen from the 
subject, and arrested in objects, completely mystical? The Lacan of “there is an Other of the 
Other” could be said to have been transcendental, if one is permitted to use this term with 
liberty. In Seminar V (1957-1958), he says, “analytic experience shows the us the 
indispensability of the background provided by the Other with respect to the Other, without 
which the universe of language could not articulate itself”26. The empirical fact that people 
speak, that they enter the symbolic and constitute history, is justified on the presupposition that 
the Oedipus complex has been resolved for them. In other words, there is here a classical 
transcendental move, in which one starts from an empirical observation (that there is Borromean 
knot) and an inference is made about its condition of possibility, so to speak, i.e. that a paternal 
metaphor must be presupposed so that “the universe of language can articulate itself”. History is 
possible because there is a successful paternal metaphor that moves the subject beyond the 
imaginary destructive dyad with the mother; that is to say, the subject is constituted by the threat 
of castration, of yielding up the fantasy of being the phallus for the mother. Yet, less than a year 
later, Lacan claims, “there is no such signifier that would guarantee the consequence of the 
                                               
25 Lacan, Écrits, 684. 
 
26 Quoted in Chiesa, 107. 
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manifestation of any signifier”27. This position can also be used to ground the possibility of 
history. For does not the existence of a transcendental signifier that ‘always-already’ unfolds the 
relation between the subject’s desire and the signifier in a particular way imply that nothing new 
happens in history? That everything is determined beforehand, like Kant’s ahistorical a priori 
concept of the understanding?28 So a transcendental Other guarantees the possibility of history at 
all, of the emergence of the subject into a symbolic universe, and that the lack of an Other of the 
Other not only guarantees its non-closure, but also the implication of the Other in the dialectic of 
the subject’s desire.  
 
 When a universal paternal metaphor was presupposed by Lacan, a distinction had to be 
made between individual speech and the symbolic universe of language. It is only then that one 
could speak of an intersubjective history and of the universal law of the symbolic. The spiritual 
roots of the subject were outside, so to speak. At this time, Lacan’s theory of the symbolic 
requires a non-deceptive element in order to function, an element that turns the field of 
imaginary feint (i.e. presence and absence of an image) into the symbolic field of speech. This 
implied that truth “requires another locus- the locus of the Other…the Other as witness who is 
Other than any of the partners”29. We can say that the erected stones of the phallic culture of 
                                               
27 Ibid. 
 
28 “Transcendental philosophy has the advantage but also the obligation to seek its concepts in 
accordance with a principle, since they spring pure and unmixed from the understanding, as 
absolute unity, and must therefore be connected among themselves in accordance with a concept 
or idea. Such a connection, however, provides a rule by means of which the place of each pure 
concept of the understanding and the completeness of all of them together can be determined a 
priori, which would otherwise depend upon whim or chance.” Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure 
Reason, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 204. 
 
29 Lacan, Écrits, 684. 
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menhirs represent something like a transcendental ego, one that guarantees consistency of the 
locus of the symbolic truth. The temporality of this move is always already prior. To use the 
language of Being and Time, which we will come to shortly, the disclosure of being is an “a 
priori perfect”. 
Now, with the denial of the existence of the Big Other, what becomes of truth? Whereas 
before the transcendent name-of-the-father separated the real (which was simply that which the 
symbolic is not) from the subject, now a direct contact between the real of language and the 
individual’s speech is established. As Chiesa explains, “the fact that there is no Other of the 
Other entails the impossibility of distinguishing between the universal and the individual 
level”30. It is an interesting question whether the impossibility to distinguish between them 
entails a collapse of transcendence. But what is sure is that from the 1960’s on, “Lacan 
relativizes the function of the name-of-the-father, and... speaks of the names-of-the-father in the 
plural”31. It is interesting to compare this with a passage from Subversion of the Subject, the first 
essay in which, according to Chiesa, Lacan announces the non-existence of the big other: 
“It is this image that becomes fixed- this is the ideal ego- from the point at which the subject 
fixates as ego-ideal...In the capture it undergoes due to its imaginary nature, the ego masks its 
duplicity; that is, consciousness, in which the ego assures itself an indisputable existence...is in 
no way immanent in the ego, but rather transcendent, since consciousness is based on the ego-
ideal as a unary trait. As a result, the transcendental ego itself is relativized, implicated as it were 
in the misrecognition in which the ego’s identification originates”.32 
                                               
30Chiesa, 116. 
 
31 Chiesa, 117. 
 
32 Lacan, Écrits, 685. 
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 The relativization of the name-of-the-father can be said to be equivalent to the 
relativization of the transcendental ego. The reason for this relativization is not that the 
transcendental ego is a figment of the imagination, a mere semantic game that hides beneath it a 
deceptive ontic concern, but rather because transcendence is already a function of the ego. In 
other words, the erected stones are relativized, deprived of their transcendental function, not 
because they are nothing but stones, mere objects of reality, but because the ego does not 
recognize its dependence on transcendence. The Other is implicated in a relation of 
misrecognition, one that is constitutive of the ego. One could say that the phrase “Dasein is 
always mine” is fraught with the same ambiguity and misrecognition. The subject is extimate to 
itself; he is neither completely inside the box of ego (something always already reaches out), nor 
is he in a position of transcendence with respect to himself, a position where he can view himself 
objectively from the outside. Another way of putting it is to say that the subject is constitutively 
non-identical to itself. So in Seminar V, before the relativization of the name-of-the-father, Lacan 
says, “besides speech and super-speech- the law of the father...something else is necessary. It is 
for this reason that the phallus, the elective signifier, introduces itself”33. Here the name of the 
father is clearly distinguished from the phallus, yet later, according to Chiesa, when the real is 
the real-of-the-symbolic, “whenever Lacan refers to the name-of-the-father, he is speaking of 
something which is perfectly identifiable with phallus and S(A)”34. So we get two propositions: 
Before the kehre, the phallus needed the transcendental paternal law in order to be instituted as a 
signifier of lack in the other, so that “something may be established for the subject between the 
                                               
33 Quoted in Chiesa, 118. 
 
34 Ibid, 119. 
 
14 
 
big Other qua locus of speech and the phenomenon of [the subject’s] desire”35. After the Kehre, 
we have a superimposition, an identification, between the phallus and the paternal-law. What 
happens to the function of transcendence then? To having access to an historical, symbolic 
existence? Does the phallus now acquire a transcendent function, or is the subject doomed to the 
misery of playing “fort-da” with object a? 
 
1.3 From Name-of-the-father to père-version, Or From Metaphysics to Discursive Truth 
 
 
 Thus one of the main consequences of the nonexistence of the big Other is that even what 
Lacan calls “idiotic” jouissance, masturbation, which is, given the import of non-existence of 
sexual relation in the analytic discourse, more common than one might think,  is not totally 
idiotic. Previously, idiotic jouissance could not have any import beside its imaginary narcissistic 
solipsism since the phallus, the signifier that does not signify anything but is a place holder for 
lack, the failure of symbolic consistency, was distinguished from the S1, the primary signifier. 
Late Lacan, in his working out of the aftermaths of the lack of such of a signifier, found no other 
way than to fully assume the consequence: namely, that the phallus is actually incarnated in S1.36 
In other words, the idiocy of such a jouissance is fully assumed as designating the fundamental 
solipsistic nature of human reality. Consequently, the importance of Lacan’s Borromean 
topology stems from the fact that it orients “man’s being in the world” not by relying on the 
Other , but “by taking its bearings from each subject’s particular invention- or fiction- for the 
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treatment of his Real”37.  Lacan, in his late Seminar XXIII no longer believes in the universal 
validity of the Oedipus complex as a way of the subject’s entry into the symbolic, attempts the 
replacement of the name of the father with the père-version, thus highlighting the integral role of 
the function of disavowal for modern subjectivity38. As Véronique Voruz explains, the 
disintegration of the Other of love as a unique site of truth makes disavowing real castration the 
only way for the subject to attain his sexual partner39. The Other of love, being no longer a 
universal symbolic Other, becomes a unique, particular Other of love. In perversion, the 
subject’s bodily consistency is dependent upon the gaze of the loving Other40.  
 The subject has only to disavow any, so to speak, metaphysico-ontological dimensions 
that sexuality might have and treat it, so to speak, as a phenomenological affair, in other words, 
as the symbolic. The pervert, therefore, avows the symbolic lack only in order to be the one that 
corks, fills up, such a lack through imaginary identification with the phallus. The pervert’s 
partner has no real jouissance; his\her knowledge is not situated in the Other. The site where the 
pervert’s partner fails to see the distinction between his cause of desire and his object of desire is 
where the pervert directs his attacks, against the subject assumed as the locus of knowledge, as 
the ‘I’ that knows. The pervert thus puts himself in place of the Other that enjoys his partner as 
an object; that is to say, the pervert imagines himself as object a in relation to the Other as the 
subject of desire. It is precisely because they enjoy the partner as an object that Lacan claims 
they produce a subversive “savoir-faire”, a knowledge that is not merely symbolic, or 
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phenomenological, but rather “of the nature of things”, in so far as “there is a direct connection 
between sexual behavior and its truth, namely, its amorality”41. Yet, Voruz’s discussion of 
perversion in her article “The Topology of the Subject of the Law” comes mostly under the 
heading of the Other of love as a way for the subject to assume his\her place in the symbolic 
order. Perversion as she sees this dimension of it, is indeed a way to keep things functioning, 
although at the price of a double alienation that requires psychoanalytic intervention. Where does 
the subversive knowledge of perverts Lacan talks about fit in then?  I think this can be answered 
in the following passages from Seminar XX: 
 What was seen, but only regarding men, is that what they deal with is object a, and that 
the whole realization of the sexual relationship leads to fantasy. It was seen, of course, regarding 
neurotics. [People] could not help but notice that there was a correlation [between neurotics and] 
the perversions.42 
 But people had the opportunity after that to notice that the perversions, such as we 
believe we discern them in neurotics, are not that at all. Neurosis consists in dreaming, not 
perverse acts. Neurotics have none of the characteristics of perverts. They simply dream of being 
perverts.43 
 
 Thus if, as Voruz contends, it is true that  Lacan says that in the structure of modern 
subjectivity “ the law here is the law of love, in other words, perversion”44, then the fact must be 
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acknowledged that the general neurosis of humanity finds its perverse dimension in dreaming, 
and not so much in its actions. It is precisely because the neurotic does not act on its perverse 
fantasy, in other words, that he does not “push away reality in fantasy”45, that he does not follow 
the symbolic to the end. Perverts, those for whom the act consists of enjoying the partner as an 
object, by virtue of being the phallus for him\her, produce a subversive knowledge in so far as 
they cannot but make the object fail. The impossibility of inscribing the sexual relationship in the 
Other is attested to by the pervert’s never-ending failure to anchor the phallus in the real. That is 
why Lacan says the perverts are “the ones Aristotle didn’t want to see at all costs”46, precisely 
because of the challenge they pose to the “golden mean”, or “the happy medium”, the precarious 
balance according to which reality is constituted.  
 The law of perversion, then, makes it possible to map its structure on what Lacan says 
about phallic jouissance. Man cannot approach a woman except as his object cause of desire. The 
consequence of this fact is that “the act of love is the male polymorphous perversion”47. Hence, 
and of course in accordance with everything articulated in psychoanalysis since Freud, sexuality 
has no norm on the basis of which it can measure its other manifested forms and call them 
perversions. Sexuality is itself a perversion in so far as the norm, if one must use this world, is 
that the real of the sexual relationship is impossible. The male pole of the sexes can only alienate 
itself in the enjoyment of his fantasy, which is constructed around his object a. The Other 
jouissance, the feminine jouissance in so far as the jouissance of her organ fails, is barred for 
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man. That is why Lacan defines the pleasure principle as “the coalescence of a with S(A)”48.  
The more man confuses his a, but that already delivers the meaning since a in so far as it is the 
cause of desire is not his at all, with S(A), “the less he hates, the less he is”49. We will come to 
the function of being in so far as it is based entirely on the cause of desire as a void, in other 
words, on what Lacan calls the semblance. For now it is important to anticipate where the letter, 
in so far as it plays a role in jouissance, comes to play a role in this structure. The knowledge ,S2, 
that is produced by the pervert has its subversive core in the fact that it stops the phallus not 
being written. In other words, it writes the phallus. This is how Lacan defines the contingent 
function of the phallus in Seminar XX, that which “stops not being written”50. I think it is 
demonstrated well enough historically that the phallus functions much more effectively when it 
is not questioned, when it is not pointed out, when, in Lacan’s words, it is “reserved in ancient 
times to the Mysteries.”51 The neurotics, in dreaming of being a pervert, resuscitate the ancient 
function of mysteries. Whereas the pervert, in disavowing castration, points to the way in which 
the sense that is produced in the fantasmatic sexual link leads to non-sense, assuming of course, 
that he is at the level of the drive, in other words, that he acts. The knowledge produced here is 
not a mere semblance. Of course the pervert in the neurotic’s dreams can only enjoy his fantasy 
because he is relying secretly on a form of a big Other (hence the disavowal of castration).  
 No wonder then that Lacan’s famous formulation of the ethical maxim of psychoanalysis, 
‘do not compromise your desire’, came alongside his articulation of the positions of enunciation 
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of Kant and Sade. This is because the point of these latter two is to transform the super-egoistic 
enjoyment into a universal maxim, a way to arrive at a pure signifying chain in order to force 
their way into the real of the Thing. Thus in Seminar XX, and right after the last passage we 
quoted about “amorality” as the truth of sexual behavior, Lacan immediately connects it to Kant 
and Sade in so far as in both of them the Good object is posited, not as an unmoved mover the 
way Aristotle conceived it, but as “endlessly saying good things”52. This is the formula Lacan 
gave us for phallic jouissance, according to which man can reach the Other only on the basis of 
infinity.  
 Therefore, it may not be a bad idea to distinguish the neurotics’ dreams of being a pervert 
and those who attempt to say the whole truth as they imagine it, namely, that they are what the 
Other lacks. The latter, if one may put it this way, could be said to be subject of the drive as 
opposed to subjects of desire, i.e. the neurotics who dream of being perverts. If it is true, as 
Lacan claims, that perversion is new the law, then a new articulation of the relation of this law to 
the drive must be elaborated. The goal of analysis, defined as sending back the subject’s message 
in an inverted form, is structured around subjects of desire. The analyst gives them such a 
message inverted in the same way a semblance enacts the object cause of desire53. The result is, 
of course, a doubling of desire, in other words, transference. The analyst, just like Socrates does 
with Alcibiades, shows the analysand an image of himself desiring by dissociating the imaginary 
object from that which sustains it, the void that is the cause of desire. Yet Lacan’s formulation of 
the non-existence of the big Other was also in part that which insists in analysis, that which 
resists interpretation. Consequently, there should be a more appropriate way of intervening in the 
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knot of jouissance that is more fit to the nature of the drive rather than to the nature of desire. 
Hence the purchase of the materiality of the letter in relation to writing, as Lacan later theorizes 
it, as a form of jouissance that deals with the subject of the drive.  
 If, again, the law of perversion is the law of modern subjectivity, then a form of 
perversion must be distinguished from the pervert that secretly depends on the big Other, and 
instead must be equated with phallic jouissance. The death drive54 is, of course, not that which is 
opposed to the pleasure principle. It is the pleasure principle pushed to its limits. Therefore, the 
coalescence between a and S(A), as that which defines the pleasure principle, can produce a 
knowledge that is subversive in the sense that it stops not writing the phallus. This is attested to 
by what is mentioned above as a consequence of the barring of the Other, namely, that S(A) and 
phallus are perfectly superimposed on each other.  
Lacan said in Seminar XX that the other consequence of scientific discourse, besides a 
subversion of connaissance (a knowledge that “participates in the fantasy of inscription of the 
sexual link”55), is that we are becoming the subject of instruments and gadgets. This, I think, has 
the consequence not only of disavowing the real as the impossible, but also of allowing more and 
more mediums for realizing one’s fantasies. They are, in other words, means of pleasure. 
Consequently, they will certainly encourage some of those neurotics to real-ize their dreams of 
disavowing castration. It is certainly only with such subjects that a topology of writing may be 
effective.  
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1.4 Historicists: neurotics who dream of being perverts 
 
 
 As I have suggested above, there is a structural affinity between disavowing the real lack 
in the Other and disavowing the ontological import of metaphysical questions. The pervert fears 
most that he may be an object of the Other’s jouissance, “for to accept that the Other lacks 
introduces unbearable anguish”56. Therefore, far from acknowledging the failure of sexual 
relation in the real, he disavows the whole import of the question; it is for him a pseudo-problem. 
One can also say this about a certain discursive movement that takes the object of philosophy to 
describe the discursive condition under which something like truth can emerge. Metaphysical 
questions are questions of being in so far as the latter is taken to be equated with substance (this 
certainly started with Heidegger), and consequently have their roots in , or at least correlative 
with, the traditional conception of the subject as an enclosed space of thinking and knowing. The 
scandal of philosophy, according to Heidegger, which apparently was taken as an unquestioned 
truism, is that a proof of the existence of the world is demanded at all. We are always already in 
the world.  This is probably the inaugural gesture of disavowal. Psychoanalytic discourse as it is 
articulated by Lacan allows us to redeem the whole import of traditional metaphysical questions. 
Certainly the point is not to pose these questions in the way the ancients did. But the purchase to 
be gained is rather to acknowledge that the fact of their failure to provide answers is certainly not 
superfluous. How does Lacan achieve this? He achieves by “opposing to the concept of 
being…the notion that we are duped by jouissance”57. In other words, he takes jouissance, in so 
far as it is the jouissance of the body, to be the only substance. 
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 It is not particularly easy to begin talking about historicism as such. For, one might 
object, the word is an umbrella word that unifies under it conflicting discourses (Foucauldian and 
Derridean discourses, for example) and any attempt to construct a reality from such a notion 
would appear as arrogantly over-arching and reductive. Yet perhaps historicism, in the precise 
sense of anti-essentialism, can only manifest itself in different, and even conflicting discourses, 
just like the act of love for the masculine side of speaking beings, because what he approaches on 
the other side is only his object-cause of desire manifests itself in polymorphous perversion58. In 
any case, the justification of creating a category of thought called historicism, even if on a closer 
investigation the empirical data would render such a category unfounded and fabricated, is that it 
is merely for our thought, cannot be an external matter to our topic. It is a matter of nothing less 
than what Lacan attempted to articulate as the position of speech from which a discourse is 
enunciated. If it is true that psychoanalytic discourse bases itself on the nonexistence of sexual 
relationship, then it is the only discourse that confronts the speaking being’s fantasmatic 
construction of reality. One might object: “All right, sexual relation must be supplemented with a 
fantasmatic construction, but what does that have to do with reality?” The answer to this question 
resides in the following formulation: that psychoanalysis contends that “reality is approached 
with the apparatus of jouissance”59. The discourse of being is therefore replaced by the discourse 
of the jouissance of the body; in other words, we are duped, played, mastered by jouissance60. 
What, then, can be said of ego, with which the world (Welt) is approached, other than it is 
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nothing more than a precarious construction, a collage of rhetoric put together according to the 
principle that confuses object a for the Other, namely, the pleasure principle? 
 To return to what we said in the introduction about the “fate of desire”, we must add, 
following Lacan, that the fact that sexual relation is impossible “doesn’t in any way diminish the 
interest we must have in the Other”61. And it is only on the basis of the Other that one can speak 
of a history at all. For Lacan, the Other, as locus of truth, is an inevitable correlate of the fact of 
speaking: “As long as things are said, the God hypothesis will persist”62. Yet it is not the Other 
as a universal process imbedded with a telos, nor the Other as a network of signifiers with a final 
word that determines all other words. The Other that concerns itself with the purpose ancient 
forms of writing might have served is an example Lacan gives of “the habitual function of 
History”63 In short, what is of interest is not at all History insofar as it has meaning, since 
meaning only veils the jouissance of the lack of being, and thus investigating forms of writing, or 
anything for that matter, under the heading of a purpose obfuscates language as an apparatus of 
jouissance. What is of interest to us is history with the following proviso: the subject of 
enunciation is not the Other of meaning, but the Other insofar as it is barred. 
 If we cast what we are calling historicism in the light of what we are also calling anti-
essentialism (but what is essential is the fact that there is no sexual relation) has the immediate 
repercussion of linking history or historicity proper to truth value to the extent that truth in 
psychoanalysis is indexed on the failure of inscribing the sexual rapport. Historicism, naively 
defined, is the demonstration of how the universality of a certain notion is, if not completely 
reduced to, at least marked by the specific, contingent, historico-empirical circumstances of the 
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time in which it was produced64. Such contextualizing refrains from making a judgment, or an 
interpretation: it refrains from intervening under the pretext that all which lies within its power 
enables historicism only to describe the set of circumstances under which such discourse, such 
notion, can arise. There is no truth, or “truth” is merely an empty container filled with the 
specific socio-political power relations of the era in question.  
 But the apparent neutrality of such contextualizations is deceiving because it ignores the 
dimension of speech, and consequently, of jouissance as a “dit-mension of the body”65, the 
dimension that speech brings with it. The point is, of course, not to return to any transcendent 
subject that defies any historical or symbolic over-determination. We should acknowledge that 
historical contextualization, in limiting itself to uncovering the conditions under which 
discourses arise, disavows the agency of the subject. The subject’s agency must be understood 
not as subject as the commander of the verb, but rather that it is subject of the verb. This is what 
being duped by jouissance means. In other words, it is more appropriate to attribute this agency 
to the letter since it is the letter, as a fragment of the real, which insists itself in the symbolic. For 
Lacan, the letter is distinguished from the message just as the position of enunciation (the 
unconscious) is distinguished from the statement (consciousness): “That one speaks remains 
forgotten behind what is said in what is heard/understood”66. The articulated language in what is 
said in what is heard, i.e. the signifier that is carried in the letter, obfuscates the very fact of  
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enunciation. It is on the basis of this fact, the fact that although the letter carries a signifier, it is 
nonetheless at a disjunction with respect to the dimension of the signifier, that “the letter always 
arrives at its destination.” As Philippe Hellebois contends, “For the destination in question is 
nothing other than the jouissance of whoever makes use of it. It is in this sense that the letter is 
littoral, tracing for the subject the contours of being.”67 Therefore, the historical 
contextualization will remain vacuous if not linked to the fact that the subject is divided from his 
jouissance. 
 The thesis here is that this “suspension of truth-judgment,” which has turned hitherto 
metaphysico-ontological questions into historicist-discursive ones, functions as a defence 
mechanism against, or a kind of an avoidance of, a certain deadlock, a certain antagonism where 
the modern subject is, as Joan Copjec puts it, in too close a proximity to his object a. In a similar 
vein, one can see the unbearable anguish of the pervert being an object for the Other if he 
confronts its lack. In other words, the repressed consequences of the deterioration of symbolic 
distance return in the form of an avoidance of ontological questions. The contextualiziation and 
deconstruction of narrative has the function of preventing us from fully identifying with the 
narrative, from acting as if such narrations (historical or philosophical) have a ground in the real 
and not merely a symbolic game of differential signifiers. The psychical capital of such 
avoidance, of assuming implicitly an exceptional, unaccounted-for position outside narrative, is 
the avoidance of an encounter with the real impossibility, with the real limit which will allow us 
to traverse the fundamental fantasy. It is only with such an encounter with a limit that 
psychoanalysis achieves one of its important tasks, namely, to shift the subject’s unconscious 
relation to jouissance. 
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 In other words, the function of such “full identification” is to enact the dreams of 
neurotics. The point is to enact the inevitably failed attempt to ground the narrative in the real. 
For what will be revealed then is nothing but the fact that the symbol does not adhere to the 
thing, that there is no natural correlation between the signifier and signified. The call for full 
identification, similar to the call not to compromise one’s desire, is to reveal that full 
identification is impossible. This, indeed, is one of Lacan’s formulas for arriving at the cut that is 
the unconscious: the mapping out of the whole network, following the letter traces, so that “the 
unconscious, when it gives up, testifies that it exists nowhere but in [the cut].”68 
 
1.5 Transference And the Semblance of being 
 
 Again, in linking historicism to a suspension of truth-judgment, we are effectively 
achieving the opposite: linking the historical experience proper, i.e. history itself, to truth. This 
link between history and truth (designated very vaguely and very generally as “essentialist” in 
the sense that it poses an objectifiable limit according to which a “measurement” or 
“interpretation” is possible) was designated by Lacan as “a profession arrived at recently in 
hystory”69.  In spelling history in a hysterical way, Lacan is suggesting that only hystory can 
stand in stark contrast to the pseudo-hermeneutic spelling as his-story, that “the question of 
another reason” has been possible at all. Lacan articulates this ‘other reason’ as going beyond the 
mere care of the self and earning money, and thus grants it an ethical dimension.  In 
psychoanalysis, what the hysteric cannot tolerate is the non-lack in the Other: his or her ethical 
                                               
68  Quoted in Miller, “Matheme”, 47. 
 
69 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis: The Seminar of Jacques 
Lacan, Book XI (New York: Norton, 1998), viii. 
 
27 
 
call is the death drive insofar as the hysteric realizes the structural impossibility of finding 
his\her lack, or his\her complement, in the Other. Here, the Other is understood to be a field 
which precedes the existence of the subject and whose structures determine the subject. 
 Therefore, in order for the hysteric to be “cured” in analysis, her desire must be posited in 
relation to the analyst as unsatisfied desire70. The hysteric must receive the message of its lack, in 
the sense that she previously has posited the other as a beyond, in the sense that the big Other has 
closed itself into a totality, in an inverted form. That is to say, the lack must become a positive 
lack, when the middle term connects the two extremes as a messenger: in effect, the messenger 
tells the beyond that the individual is no longer an individual, that it has renounced its object a, 
that it has become lacking, and telling the individual that the in-itself, God, which for Lacan 
belongs to the real and not to the symbolic, is no longer an extreme other, but has also become a 
lover. The incarnation of the imaginary subject in an image that reveals the void of desire is at 
the same time a capture, an entrapment of a piece of the real that makes the latter imbedded in 
the dialectic of the symbolic.  It is the image of the beloved as lacking which is the result of 
complete ignorance and complete veiling. That is why Lacan in Seminar XX says the 
unconscious is “the fact that being, by speaking, enjoys and wants to know nothing about it”71. 
What is at stake in the dialectic of love is the incarnation of the imaginary subject. In other 
words, an image appears where, from the perspective of knowledge, there should be nothing. In 
“Kant avec Sade,” Lacan characterizes the function of beauty as “an ultimate barrier that forbids 
access to a fundamental horror”72, i.e. object a. In love, in making things beautiful, what we seek 
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is not the abyssal singularity of the other subject but a distance from object a, from the object 
cause of desire.  
 In Read My Desire: Lacan Against the Historicists, Joan Copjec demonstrates how the 
decline of the symbolic distance that protected the subject from the horror of its object a since 
the nineteenth century is the consequence of the utilitarian definition of the subject which 
declared that the subject was indeed equal to its traces, that it could be fully grasped in its use or 
function73. It is the deterioration of the symbolic (the death of God according to Nietzsche) that 
forced our environment (the return of the repressed) to bear the burden of this death in the guise 
of symptomatic phenomena such as overcrowding and the danger of passive smoking. The 
deconstruction of context, of narrative, then, is the disavowal of the return of the repressed; it 
disavows the deterioration of the symbolic and its effects on the subject. Instead of accepting 
once and for all, that narrative has no final meaning, no stability, or to use Hegelian language, no 
being-in-itself, which are all consequences of the deterioration of the symbolic, the 
deconstructive gesture merely defers the belief in the symbolic with the hope that one day it 
would be possible to institute it, although this day may never come.  
 It is clear that the question of traversing the fantasy is not for Lacan a question of making 
sure, in keeping aware that beyond social discourses there is a pure subjective content, say a 
warm human being, an innocent child, or a devout mother. Rather, it is, as Zupančič writes in her 
Ethics of the Real, a question of mapping the whole network of possibility74. This mapping out is 
driven by truth, in other words, by the subject’s constant attempts to ground the symbolic in the 
real, thus disavowing the structural fact that the real lacks in the symbolic. Therefore, if as a 
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discourse, utility has overcrowded the environment, trapping the subject in the image of its 
traces, then it has also established a positive will of the other, a will which is determined 
according to seeking what is pleasurable and avoiding what is harmful. In other words, we are 
caught in the drive of the good as such; if all that is true, then salvation does not lie in running 
melancholically from utility, but in following its claims to truth to the end and mapping its 
network. When Copjec analyses the nineteenth-century oriental fantasy of clothing, she clearly 
distinguishes between the ego-ideal of utility, that clothes should be defined only by their utility, 
and the sartorial superego which secretly hints at the exceptional pleasure derived from the 
dignity of it being the transgression of the law (for example, the weird erotic gestures that serve 
no clear purpose, the complete veiling where no parts of the body appear, etc.). This unconscious 
knowledge, this disavowed knowledge of transgression, of an exceptional jouissance to the 
function of utility, is what gives the ego-ideal of utility its consistency. In traversing the fantasy, 
“being in love, verliebtheit”, Lacan says, is “the recognition of the foundation of the narcissistic 
image insofar as it is what gives its substance to the Ideal Ego”75.  According to Lacan, this is 
what was at stake at the final scene between Alcibiades and Socrates in the Symposium. That is, 
it is a showing, an interpretation by Socrates, of the object around which Alcibiades’ fantasy was 
constructed. 
 Provisionally, we should take Lacan’s lesson to be that a symptom is a blind spot which, 
paradoxically, makes things visible; the symptom is thus crucial to visibility. If the positive will 
of the other is the symptom of utilitarianism, then it is because utilitarianism defines human 
subject as an entity which seeks pleasure and avoids pain. But as Joan Copjec explains, this 
definition is predicated upon a definition of balance. The fact that it is a definition of balance 
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means that excess has been acknowledged as existing: people who pursue pleasure or pain 
(jouissance) too much, people who suspend the reality principle, a principle whose function is to 
delay pleasure and keep the proper balance intact. This problem, according to Žižek, is the 
reason why Freud, in Totem and Taboo, had to supplement the Oedipus myth with the structural 
killing of the father: “We have all done it, we had to have done it”76. In other words, the 
reciprocity of social relation, a utilitarian fantasy, depends on an “other knowledge,” an 
unconscious knowledge that the human subject has already, structurally, crossed any proper 
balance; that its eternity, in fact its immortality, is much more important to him than his pleasure 
(understood here as the good, the goods). Thus, according to Diotima, the woman who taught 
Socrates about love in The Symposium, the fact that love is a child of Poverty is what is good in 
love; this lack links mortal beings to immortal beings77. Hence Lacan’s discussion of Socrates in 
Seminar VIII seems to be mapped on the structure of the hysteric whose cure is present only in 
her desire’s being unsatisfied. Because Socrates knows, he cannot love. Because he knows he is 
nothing, what terrifies him most is being in the position of the beloved where he is bound to be 
deceived. Knowledge clearly necessitates Socrates being a void, and once Alcibiades declares 
publicly that Socrates’ jewel, his agalma, could not be won through seduction, through desire, he 
constructs Socrates as an analyst. But what drove Alcibiades in the first place to think that 
Socrates has a secret jewel, a hidden agalma? The answer lies in what Lacan tells us about the 
discourse Socrates invented, the discourse which embodied the dictum that “in the order of the 
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just city there are no healthy beliefs which are unverified”78. Lacan credits Socrates with 
inventing the discourse of pure signifier, and it is due to this discourse that Alcibiades is 
hystericized with respect to Socrates’ desire: Che vuoi?  
 In order to be more intelligible, we must trace exactly the turning point in The Symposium 
around which Lacan situates his analyses. The agalma makes its appearance in the text of The 
Symposium, Lacan tells us, when the rule of the game is changing. It is no longer a question of 
praising love, but a question of praising the other person. It is in the relation of the one to the 
other rather than the question of love that the text is now focused on. Socrates is not yet an 
analyst when he is enjoying his “formidable metonymy,” that is, before Alcibiades makes his 
confession, a confession which is addressed to no other but the Other. In other words, a 
metonymy of desire which aims at producing knowledge cannot make any metaphorical 
substitution because it knows there is nothing there. It is this formidable metonymy which is a 
discourse of pure signifier, an infinite discourse which characterized by typical Socratic dialectic. 
For example, hotness cannot be brought into coldness without the former losing its essence, just 
as pure madness, in its attempt to bring the signifier to a stop somewhere, will perforce stop 
anywhere. It is this formidable metonymy which gives us the best illustration of traversing the 
fantasy, of mapping the entire network. The Socratic maxim of verification, contrary to the 
Nietzschean interpretation of Socrates as the corrupt kernel of reason and rationality, one which 
perhaps had contaminated a beautiful soul such as Plato (beyond good and evil), will show us 
that the chain of signification shall always be indefinite. In other words, to use Heideggerian 
language, the move from meaning to truth, or from sense to nonsense, will be effected. The 
function of Socratic impasses is thus, as Lacan indicated, structural and not a mere “fault” or an 
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“error” of intersubjectivity. Just as there is something other in the sadomasochism of Sade, 
something that goes beyond the simple asymmetry of intersubjectivity, something which cannot 
be explained by reference to the narcissistic wound (when this wound is understood as requiring 
an imaginary recognition of the, from the, other in order to temporarily alleviate its suffering and 
constructs a misunderstood relation), there is something other in the desire of Socrates, in his out 
of place desire.  
 Once the question is turned towards praising the other person, the agalma comes on the 
scene. The question of the jewel inside Socrates becomes, once the jewel is found, a question of 
duty: duty becomes whatever Socrates pleases to command. Lacan relates this to Che Vuoi?—
“What do you want?” But the magic he attributes to this formula is not merely one-sided: What 
do you want from me? You are trying to corrupt me, leave me alone, etc.? The other side of the 
suspicion is an already present unconscious knowledge that desire is by definition alienated, and 
what is being asked for is a pure desire or: “a desire that is really your will.”79 In other words, the 
patient is demanding love from the beginning. In directing Alcibiades’ desire towards Agathon, 
Socrates reveals the other passion, his demon which goes beyond the desire of knowledge. It is 
the Freudian ethical maxim: that the good of the patient’s eros is the criterion and guide for any 
ethical action. Due to his austerity, to his insistence on separating desire from love, Socrates does 
not reply to Alcibiades on the level of desire. In this silence, like the silence of [the] woman at 
the level of the unconscious, Alcibiades is placed on the path to his own eros’s good.  
 In order to explore the question of Socrates’ passion, Lacan sets the figure of Socrates 
against that of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra. He opts for the eternal metonymy governing Socrates 
over the poetic and extra metaphoric Zarathustra; the former has the potential to reveal the origin 
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of the narcissistic desiring subject in creating the signifier in all its purity: desire is thus turned 
into drive. In Socrates’ metonymy, those who are not supposed to understand passion will not 
understand, nor, which is more than one can say for the metaphoric discourse of Zarathustra, will 
they imagine they have understood. The Socratic message “even though it involves something 
which refers to love, is certainly not in itself fundamentally something which begins, as one 
might say, from a center of love”80. It is rather the atopic place, the void of knowledge, which 
fuels the ascesis towards Beauty, is implied by the position from which Socrates speaks. This 
void attests to the fact that the relation between the knower and the known is not simply that of 
knowledge. Rather, it is skewed through object a. 
 The image Socrates erects for Alcibiades by interpreting his confession as one that is 
really directed towards Agathon is, in Lacan’s words, an image of Alcibiades desiring. Similarly, 
the image of seven wolves which fascinate The Wolf Man in his dream fascinate him in its 
proper seduction as an image. What becomes apparent “is that their fascinated gaze is the subject 
himself”81. When Socrates did not satisfy the local commandment of the jour, to satisfy the 
appetite of the body first and foremost, he renounced the transgression of the appetites. But what 
he was renouncing was not a philosophical despite of the body, a metaphysical prejudice against 
filthy matter in opposition to pure soul; rather, what was he renouncing was the body being taken 
as transgression, as a hostage for transgression: that is, the superego enjoyment that transgresses 
symbolic duty. Socrates also denounces the very symbolic duty, the ego-ideal, in the sense of 
democratic Ideal, which like the utility of the nineteenth century, depended on its consistency by 
rejecting the sensual, the body as pierced with symptomatic jouissance. At the time of Seminar 
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VIII, Lacan was of the position that Socrates, and the Greeks, were at that period of humanity 
when the pure signifier made its appearance, and consequently a new criterion of truth appeared 
to the subjects, one that takes its index from that same pure signifier.  For example, what makes 
The Republic so significant in the history of thought, what makes it so original and important, is 
provided in the condition which the interlocutors make Socrates uphold, prior to his proof, that 
the just man is happier than the unjust man, namely: that the unjust man has to conceal his 
injustice from the big Other, for the one “who is found out is a nobody”82. The restriction of 
being to the domain of the symbolic must be taken literally: outside the big Other, outside the 
site of fiction, our existence is inconsistent, confused: if you take away the big Other, the subject 
loses reality itself. Hence the origin of all the Platonic aporias: How to deliver truth if we are to 
keep the big Other at the same time?  
 It is at this limit between the superego and the ego-ideal that Socratic passion intervenes 
as a historical moment. It is the moment where poetry, images, and myth confront humanity as 
humanity, as pure appearance. The ethics of the real is really the ethics of the pure signifier. 
Since we suffer from subjection to pure signifier, since we are as human beings innately 
completely dependent on a symbolic Other, Lacan opts for the pure imagery as a sort of 
reproduction technique, a reproduction which is a presentation of the pure signifier: The image in 
Baroque art in all its seduction testifies to the gaze of the subject himself, that is, his image is 
himself desiring. In this reflection of desire in the mirror, in the image, we discover love: desire 
doubled is love, love doubled is illusion. The illusion and deception of love is that the subject 
thinks he can desire his image desiring, in the sense of objectifying the pure image of his desire 
in its signification, in its meaning. That is to say truth becomes desirable, that god moves the 
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world by the fact that he is beautiful. To be loved is not to become nothing, to close the big 
Other, to become desirable, and therefore to close the gap. Socrates did not give up his 
knowledge, he did not allow himself to be “filled” by the agalma that is Agathon. Once God 
becomes desirable, a whole vertigo of hysterical knowledge about what exactly is desirable in 
God ensnares the subject in an ideal ego. According to Lacan, the reformation was nothing less 
than a reaction to the fact that the beloved object is desirable: it therefore strives to recreate a 
feeling of the sublime through sin, to recreate the void, the ignorance, the non-knowledge as to 
why a beautiful God, a good God, loves a sinful man like me. Baroque Art, consequently, is 
Catholicism reborn, after it had gone through the reformation. We can say that according to 
Lacan, Baroque art corrected the deception of the Socratic demon, and attempted to restore that 
nothing where something is supposed to be. Unconscious knowledge is thus not a simple relation 
to the subject, but is mediated through object a.  
 
 
Conclusion of Chapter 1 
Erecting the pure void, object a as cause of desire, in an image is the model of the goal of 
analysis. It is a possible way of effecting a disjunction between a and S(A). But the 
consequences of the big Other as we saw in the structure of perversion makes it much more 
difficult to effect such a separation. Something nonetheless resists interpretation. In the following 
chapter we shall read Heidegger’s discourse of being to the letter. 
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Chapter II 
The Discourse of being in Heidegger 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
I think it can be well noted that Heidegger has a peculiar position in the course 
philosophy has taken since then. Despite his uncontested influence, almost of none of those who 
were influenced by him can be called ‘Heideggerians’ pure and simple. The exception is 
Gadamer, who faithfully follows the path of a ‘thinking of being’ in the precise Heideggerian 
sense of a historical disclosure of the relation between being and the essence of human beings. 
Heidegger’s legacy is strongly adhered to, amongst different parties from Foucault to 
Deconstruction, when the question is of a casting a suspicious light on a certain notion of the 
subject. This latter loses all the primacy traditional philosophy has given it. The subject is at best 
a secondary inference, an ossified cartilage that is deduced from a technical interpretation of 
thinking. The point being, of course, that thinking has all too long been a prisoner of this 
technical interpretation, just as language has to some extent been a prisoner of a grammatico-
metaphysical interpretation that imposes on it the structure of a subject and a predicate. The 
consequences of “deconstructing” the subject were immediately seen after Heidegger’s Being 
and Time and are seen everywhere today, from replacing the subject with a certain notion of 
biopolitical power, to claiming that even Heidegger was not radical enough in his questioning of 
the subject and remained hostage to a certain metaphysics of presence. Our wager is that there is 
a certain profit in dissociating Heidegger from what can be called a negative way of thinking that 
takes for its sole goal the unhinging of fixations, a way of thinking that is usually formulated 
today in the watered-down dictums of finitude and immanence: “meaning comes from 
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everywhere”; “the identity of the person is the result of a plasticity of making”; or in an 
existential reading of imagination as a projection of man’s essence in a way that transcends all 
positive determination, etc. This is not to say that Heidegger’s works do not bear some 
responsibility for such dicta. Yet we maintain that a certain ‘absolute’ dimension is traceable in 
his work, a dimension that can perhaps best be characterized by his anti-humanism, that is, by a 
refusal to reduce the thinking of being to any ontic concerns. Certainly, for Heidegger, as well 
for Freud and Lacan, no sovereign Good is the ultimate arbitrator where the only kind of errors 
allowed are judicial83. But just as certain, that there is no sovereign Good does not mean “life is 
in the making”, that now we are free to choose, to decide, to create, in the simple and naive sense 
these clichés are enunciated. The fact that there is no sovereign Good means, first and foremost, 
that thinking sustains itself only when its element is given back to it (i.e. as being). In other 
words, apropos of Lacan’s reading of the Kantian categorical imperative, there is no hierarchy of 
beings insofar as sustaining thinking is what is in question. For Lacan, Kantian morality 
“becomes a pure and simple application of the universal maxim” without any regard for any 
‘pathological’ content of any positive moral law84. One could say that, for Heidegger, thinking as 
such, as even distinguished from philosophy, becomes equated with the thinking of being. This 
definitely was his position after being and time, that is, after he abandoned the project of 
grounding Dasein’s ontical projects (i.e. thinking in which being is not explicitly thematized, yet 
implicitly understanding it is presupposed). The absolutist dimension in Heidegger must be read 
as the counterpart of Kant’s elimination of the difference between Sovereign good and any 
positive moral law. The Kantian silence in being and time is repeated: no “fort” without “da,” 
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that is to say, a thing-in-itself is impossible, and any beyond, even God, must make its 
appearance to Dasein within its being-in-the-world. What compensates for such a silence in 
Being and Time, is the superegoic space opened by the commandment to enjoy what the rural 
Dasein enjoys: The harmonious, quite, transcendental grasp of being as a totality of world-
relation, of grasping the mysterious connections between nature and the world. Such 
commandment is meant to real-ize the symbolic (to arrive at the lost object) at the expense of the 
dialectic between law and desire. 
It is not a far-fetched idea, I think, to argue that the Heideggerian project, in its 
inauguration of ontological difference, attempts to provide the coordinates of a universal 
transferential experience in the psychoanalytic sense. The fact that being is not, and cannot, be 
reduced to a being immediately points to what Lacan calls the object cause of desire- the 
mysterious x which cannot be found in any empirical object and is in surplus of ontically-
understood reality. The statement that thinking sustains itself only in its element, being, might be 
understood as having certain consequences. For example, that thinking disintegrates, loses its 
consistency if it loses that element. Yet such “therapeutic” values of the thinking of being are 
prominent only in the early Heidegger, the Heidegger of Being and Time. It is only there that 
Heidegger speaks of anxiety and guilt as having ontological dimensions, and of an authentic 
resoluteness in assuming one’s ontological burden as being-towards-death. In Being and Time, 
one can still find a certain homology between the Lacanian understanding of the unconscious as 
governed by a certain lack that is covered up, plugged, concealed in the way thinking takes its 
daily courses, and a Heideggerian understanding of being that is present and presupposed by all 
our ontical engagements yet is thematized only in an phenomenological ontology. Later 
Heidegger would find precisely in this ‘transcendental’ presupposition the erroneous point from 
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which thinking began in Being and Time. Whereas in Being and Time one of the, if not the, 
central issue, is how a certain thinking of being, an orientation, a relational predisposition, 
although “unthematized” (one might venture, “unconscious” or “unknown”), is present in 
Dasein’s different modes of being-in-the-world. In the later Heidegger, this problem disappears 
entirely. If “thinking sustains itself only in its element, in being”85, then later Heidegger is not 
concerned with the problem of how other forms of thinking which are not thinking of being, that 
is which do not take the disclosure of being as their object, sustain themselves. That is why for 
the later Heidegger, science does not think; in other words, thinking is reduced to only thinking 
of being, in an eventual disclosure of the relation between the two.  The problem of 
psychoanalysis is to show precisely how everyone, that is the speaking being in so far as s\he 
speaks, is always already engaged in a thinking of being.  
 
What I intend to do here is to show what was missing in Heidegger’s Being and Time as a 
possible discourse of an unconscious thinking of being. What is at stake here is a structural 
dimension, a structural gap, a gap of an unknown knowledge that must exist if we are to link a 
philosophical discourse on truth to the way that discourse is present as absent, as lacking, in life 
as it presents itself as a manifestation of spirit. Slavoj Žižek has pointed out that the 
Heideggerian paradigm misreads the relation between the ontological and ontical. The 
consequence of this misreading is that Heideggerians are always in search for a positive ontic 
discourse that would represent the ontological epochal truth86. Behind the complicity of concrete 
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ontic discourses (Americanism, communism, democracy) in the ontological horizon they attempt 
to reject (the point of Destruktion is to lay forth the unsaid ontological assumptions of such 
discourse), there is in Heidegger another movement: one which privileges a certain concrete 
ontic discourse as the true representative of the ontological truth of the epoch. This is why 
Heidegger could distance himself from the ontic discourse in the way that it appears to itself, and 
claim an “inner truth”, which is ontological and appears only for the observer. This inner truth is 
that which claims there is something more beyond the ideological text, a non-ideological kernel 
(say, as we will show below, the understanding of being in the ready-to-hand). As Žižek shows, 
Heidegger expected that Nazism should be aware of its inner greatness, and consequently that it 
should direct itself and conduct itself in accordance with such knowledge and awareness: “This 
expectation is profoundly metaphysical, in so far as it fails to recognize the gap separating the 
direct ideological legitimation of a movement from its inner greatness (its historico-ontological 
essence) is constitutive, a positive condition of its functioning.”87 
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2.2 Object a in Being and Time  
 
 In Being and Time there is an unresolved antagonism between two positions from which 
“beings are encountered as beings”. On the one hand, there is the position of our everyday 
practical dealings for which being is understood implicitly, but is not thematized. In this position, 
understanding of being is interpreted in terms of Kantian Transcendentalism, and consequently 
such an understanding is taken to be a priori. On the other hand, there is the position of what is 
called here “the distant observer” for whom also “beings are encountered as beings”. This is the 
position, the gaze, of Dasein as “authentic understanding of being”, or Dasein as a circular 
understanding which projects itself into the open. Let us take two themes in Being and Time as 
the exemplary mode of analysis: Besorgen as engaged dealing with beings ready-to-hand, and 
the Understanding-Interpretation relation. This chapter will show how Heidegger’s analysis of 
both of these themes contains the antagonism in question which prompts him to abandon the line 
of thought which informs Being and Time. Two statements made by Heidegger were a source of 
wonderment for me: “We always cope with beings as beings,”88 and beings at hand “show 
themselves genuinely only in such dealing [engaged heedfulness]”89 . These statements are 
difficult to think because they involve two positions, the relation between which is not clarified 
anywhere in Heidegger’s philosophy.  
Phenomenological reflection must show the being of entities as encountered in average 
everydayness. That is, the being of entities as encountered in the way of being of average 
everydayness, i.e., taking care (Besorgen). Phenomenology must explicate what is understood 
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implicitly in taking care as the nearest mode of being of Dasein. Entities show themselves as 
entities in taking care. This statement is ambiguous. For if the mode of being of taking care is 
that of a pre-reflective ‘immediate’ engagement, then it is clear that the as-structure (beings as 
beings) cannot be explicated from within Besorgen. Everyday engaged dealing with useful 
things, “which show themselves genuinely only in such dealings, neither grasps these beings 
thematically as occurring things, nor does such using even know the structure of useful things as 
such”90 . How should we understand the fact that the being of useful things (their structure of in-
order-to) shows itself only in taking care, yet such a mode of Dasein’s being is incapable of 
knowing these entities as the entities they are, that is, as they are ontologically determined by 
their in-order-to structure? When Heidegger says that “in such useful dealings, taking care 
subordinates itself to the in-order-to constitutive for the particular utensil in our dealings”91, this 
“subordination” must not be understood as a coming to the surface, a showing of itself, of the in-
order-to structure as an in-order-to structure. If the in-order-to structure in so far as it refers to a 
totality of other ontological structures (what-for, with-which, and in-which) is the being of the 
entities ready-to-hand, and further, if the being of beings is that which for the most part does not 
show itself and “remains concealed”, then it is a mistake to imagine (think representatively) the 
ontologically definitive in-order-to as showing itself in itself in our dealings. “What is peculiar to 
what is initially at hand”, Heidegger writes, “is that it withdraws, so to speak, in its character of 
handiness to be really at hand”92.  
This withdrawal and its possibility is conditioned by the utmost (im)possibility of Dasein, 
death. But unlike the Freudian death drive, death in existential analysis remains an external limit 
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to all possible experience. Its possibility is the no-longer being-in-the-world, whereas the death 
drive, if one may articulate it this way, is the way the real speaks at the very heart of our 
experience. It is not an impossibility beyond the phenomenological realm, but rather a very real 
possibility at the intersection between life and death. In other words, although the death drive 
could be described as active annihilation, this annihilation is not the result of death as a limit, an 
end, but is the result of “the subject…reducing itself solely to the certainty of being a subject”93. 
A too-muchness of life. Therefore, if the as-structure of handiness is to designate being, it must 
remain concealed. That is to say, the subject must not be reduced solely to the certainty of being 
a subject. Just like a dream is read in what is said about it, the unconscious thought reveals the 
unconscious “I am”, “provided, and this is the leap, someone thinks in [the subject’s] place”94. 
The Being of the useful things disappears into itself in taking care (Besorgen), it conceals itself 
in this pre-reflective engagement so that, from within this engagement, that with which Besorgen 
is concerned is not the Being of tools, but the work as a totality. The in-order-to is thus implicit 
from the perspective of Besorgen; the being of handiness is implicitly understood. What does 
this mean? What does it mean to say that Being is implicitly understood? To say Being is 
implicitly understood in dealing with tools does not merely assert what is understood (Being) as 
an external fact to the dealing which can be proven only by enumerating phenomena from 
practical everydayness and, as it were, attaching them to Being. In other words, Being as what is 
implicitly understood is not inferred based on some evidence that ‘it must be implicitly 
understood in engaged dealing’, just like, for example, Kant’s transcendental apperception is 
inferred and posited as an issue of validity whose status is only that ‘it must be the case’. Rather, 
what is implicit must be thought of as implicit. That is to say, implicitness is a necessary moment 
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in thinking Being because it belongs to the essence of Being to be implicit. What is being called 
an implicit character of Being is, of course, nothing other than what Heidegger later would call 
the concealment of Being. Let us clarify this further.  
 
The Withdrawal of Handiness: 
  Throughout his discussion of the Being of useful things, Heidegger was aware of the 
problem of “volatizing reality”. “If we define”, Heidegger writes, “the being of what is at hand 
(relevance) and even worldliness itself as a referential context, are we not dissolving the Being of 
inner worldly beings into pure thought?”95 . In order to avoid this problem he makes a distinction 
between “the being of innerworldly beings initially encountered (handiness)” and “the being of 
the ontic conditions of possibility of discovering innerworldly beings in general, the worldliness 
of the world”96 . Handiness is “the ontological, categorical definition of beings as they are in 
themselves”97, beings, that is, unlike Dasein, whereas worldliness is an “existential structure of” 
Dasein itself. If Handiness is the being of beings unlike Dasein “initially” encountered in our 
environment, then why is Heidegger concerned about “volatizing reality”? The reason is that he 
defines the being of what is at hand as a “referential context”. Yet a referential context, as the 
ontological structure of serviceability, is constitutive of the worldliness which is a characteristic 
of Dasein. Therefore, Heidegger oscillates between two definitions of Handiness, the 
phenomenal relation between the two definitions is not clarified anywhere in Being and Time. 
There is Handiness as the “being of innerworldly beings initially encountered” and Handiness as 
“the ontological, categorical definition of beings as they are in themselves”. To distinguish tools 
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from the existential structure of worldliness, and thus to give a ‘transcendental’ priority to 
worldliness, Heidegger resorts to the first definition. To avoid both ascribing to Being a 
subjective character imposed by Dasein and consequently maintaining a sort of Kantian thing-in-
itself, he employs the second. In order for handiness as “the being of innerworldly beings 
initially encountered” to emerge, the handiness of the ontological/categorical must “withdraw 
itself in its being”. Thus the issue of “volatizing reality” is the result of the desire to apply 
“worldliness” in its “referential structure” to the things in themselves. So how does the first 
definition of handiness as “the being of innerworldly beings initially encountered” avoid 
“volatizing reality”? We answered this question above when we attempted to distinguish two 
meanings of “in” in Heidegger’s statement that entities at hand “show themselves genuinely only 
in such dealing [engaged heedfulness]”98. There is the ‘in’ from the perspective of Besorgen 
itself, and the ‘in’ from the perspective of a distant observer. When Heidegger speaks of the 
“being of innerworldly beings initially encountered,” he must have in mind the first meaning of 
‘in’, that is, from the perspective of the engaged worker. But things are not so simple; the gaze of 
the distant observer is already involved in this first case too. As we said, handiness in so far as it 
refers to the “ontological, categorical definition of beings as they are in themselves” does not 
show itself at all in “immediate” engagement. This practical engagement operates on a 
completely pre-reflective level. In any case, it does not operate with the “what-for”, “in-which”, 
and the “with-which” as such in mind. Because of this fact Heidegger uses this definition of 
handiness to take a distance from worldliness as an existential structure. It is, as if, a handiness 
in-itself, not-yet explicit, an underdeveloped, concealed heedfulness that does ‘not know’ it is 
heedfulness. Therefore, Heidegger is not accurate enough when he writes, “When a being shows 
itself in general to heedfulness, that is, when a being is discovered in its being, it is always 
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already a thing at hand in the surrounding world and precisely not “initially” merely present 
“world-stuff”99. The contention is not that what shows itself “initially” to heedfulness is merely 
present and world stuff. No. However, neither is it simply “discovered in its being” through 
heedfulness. The ready-to-hand, when it shows itself to heedfulness, is not the same moment 
when it is discovered in its Being as the being that it is. Or rather, when the ready-to-hand is 
discovered in its Being as ready-to-hand, it is not discovered at all for heedfulness, but for a 
distant observer, for one who has let things be. Handiness, to repeat the quote above, has the 
peculiar character of withdrawing itself in order to be the being that it is. Heedfulness is not a 
thinking of Being; rather, in heedfulness, handiness completely withdraws into its being. The 
phenomenon of worldliness can only be brought into a “kind of definiteness” through “letting 
something be relevant”100. To let things at hand be means to “let them be as they are and in order 
that they be such”. Is this an attitude of a heedful engagement in the world or rather of a distant 
observer who can, as it were, “abstract” from the engagement? Heidegger writes in a footnote on 
the same page: “Letting-be. “On the Essence of Truth” where letting-be is related in principle 
and very broadly to every kind of being!”101. In Identity and Difference, Heidegger is of the 
thought that what determines the experience of thinking is a “letting belong together of man and 
Being”102. This is the event of appropriation which is achieved through “a spring [as] the 
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abruptness of the unbridged entry into that belonging”103. An unbridged leap is throws Dasein 
into the clearing face-to-face with Being. The fact that such a leap is unbridged indicates that the 
distance missing in Being and Time is thematized here; the leap must be an ungrounded spring, 
the initial movement of thought without detour, in inventing a new terminology of ontological 
structures. “Letting belong” as an abrupt spring “into the abyss” can least of all be achieved in 
any heedful engagement. To let a thing be is to “let it presence in its truth”104, Heidegger 
footnotes on the same page he discusses handiness. Therefore, an unthematized distinction of 
two kinds of “letting be” is present in Being and Time. There is the “letting be” of Heedfulness 
which somehow “discovers entities as they are in their being” without somehow grasping them 
explicitly as entities, where the worldliness, in so far as it is the phenomenon of the world, is not 
present in its truth. If heedfulness must concern itself with its orientation in the world, if it must 
show the phenomenon of the world through referential totality at all, it must not be aware of the 
ontological, categorical structures of handiness. Second, there is also the “letting be” of the 
distant observer who cannot be engaged in Besorgen if he is to grasp thematically and brings to 
light the phenomenon of worldliness as such, and thus lets beings presence in their truth as the 
beings they are. We have, therefore, two kinds of “letting be” and two kinds of “as structure”. 
How are we to resolve this enigma? One can already deduce some kind of “mediation” between 
the two: handiness withdraws in its being for the distant observer. 
 
Understanding and Interpretation 
 Does not the opposition between “implicitness”, as we have characterized it, of the 
Being of the ready-to-hand as it is present in heedful engagement, and its ontological explication 
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from a distance, correspond to the pair of Understanding as the implicit understanding of Being 
and Interpretation as fundamentally characterized by the “as” structure? The standard story in 
reading Heidegger usually exalts him for being one of the original philosophers who 
demonstrated that on a fundamental level, our experience is a pre-reflective, nonconceptual mode 
of orientation in the world. Hubert Dreyfus conceptualizes the relation between “nonconceptual” 
understanding and “conceptual” understanding as that between a “ground floor” and an “upper 
floor”. Although Heidegger claims that the Being of the Da (there) is essentially Understanding, 
this assertion, Dreyfus argues, cannot be taken to support that claim that our experience is 
conceptual all the way through. For Dreyfus, Heidegger owes us an account of how 
nonconceptual content is converted into conceptual content105. However, it is dubious whether 
the term “conceptual” is relevant at all for Heidegger since there is no mind-body distinction in 
Heidegger’s philosophy but simply Da-sein as existing Being-there. Further, it is clear also that 
in Besorgen the structure of Interpretation (Auslegung) is already present. Auslegung, as 
explicating, stretching out, laying out, is “the development of Understanding”106. Heidegger 
writes that “what is disclosed in understanding, what is understood, is always already accessible 
in such a way that in it its ‘as what’ can be explicitly delineated”107. However, he further writes: 
“The ‘as’ constitutes the structure of the explicitness of what is understood; it constitutes the 
interpretation”108. So the “as structure” is present both at once in Understanding and in 
Interpretation; and interpretation is merely the articulation of what is understood; that is, the 
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articulation of “something as something”. Therefore, and if we want to understand what Dreyfus 
calls “conceptual” content as structured by the “as-structure”, it is not true that for Heidegger we, 
first and foremost, have a non-conceptual engaged experience with tools. For Heidegger, it is 
precisely because the “as” is “so primordially” contained in Besorgen that it does not show itself 
explicitly there109. To grasp something as “free of the as...requires a kind of reorientation”110 . 
Does not the fact that the “as” does not show itself explicitly in practical dealing with things 
because this dealing “contains the structure of interpretation so primordially” resonate with the 
withdrawal of the handiness into itself as the ontological-categorical Being of useful things in 
Heedfulness? And doesn’t the distinction between the “letting be” of Besorgen (letting things be 
what they are) and the “letting be” of the distant observer (letting things presence in their truth) 
corresponds to the distinction between the “as-structure” as implicitly present in Understanding, 
and the “as-structure” as Interpretive laying out of what is already understood? Do we not have 
here the same transcendental deadlock of providing a ground of the phenomenon of the world 
that gets to the world itself in its totality?  
If Heidegger had conceived of understanding as already in possession of an explicit as-
structure, this would have had two consequences: First, we would not be able to get to the world 
through referential relations. That is, if handiness appeared in its Being as handiness in 
Besorgen, this would mean that we do not dwell in the world but in worldliness (the problem of 
volatizing reality); we would take notice of the “for-which” and the “in-which” instead of “the 
south wind in its being by taking lay of the land”111. In Heedfulness, “there “is” no such thing as 
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a useful thing. There always belongs to the being of useful things a totality of useful things in 
which this useful thing can be what it is”112. In order to get to this totality, the as-structure must 
withdraw itself.  
Consequently, an explicit as-structure, since we are taking it to be a chain of signifiers, 
can only point to what Lacan calls the primacy of the symbolic, a primacy that can only effect 
the substance that being is. Here is what Lacan says in Encore when discussing the Christian 
revelation: 
  The fact that God is indissolubly three is such as to make us prejudge that the  
  count “1-2-3” pre-existed him. One of the two following statements must be true:  
  either he takes into account only the retroactive effect…and it is his being that  
  suffers a blow- or the three is prior to him, and it is his unity that takes a hit.113 
 
It is clear that the as-structure as the chain we articulated is ultimately of the same 
symbolic value as the count “1-2-3”. Hence Heidegger’s desire to make us forget the fact that the 
symbolic, or in his words, conceptual understanding, is already present at the deepest level of the 
thinking of being. In other words, the as-structure is as primordial as being-there. Yet this fact, as 
we can see from Lacan’s quote, can only engender the univocity of being. 
This description of Besorgen was Heidegger’s attack against the epistemological-
wordless subject of philosophy who represents objects “out there”. But this totality as a system 
of referential relations, the worldliness, must disappear into the world, into handy things, and, as 
it were, ‘substantialize’ them in themselves, so they can form a sort of ‘reality’ as “the being of 
handiness initially encountered”. Thus in Contributions to Philosophy Heidegger says that 
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metaphysics, in scaling over beings to beingness (say, handiness), is in danger of interpreting 
Dasein’s transcendence as an action between the ego and consciousness. This error occurs when 
handiness is not conceived as withdrawn, but rather as an idea. On the other hand, if the “as” that 
constitutes interpretation was not present (implicitly) in understanding, then again we are in 
danger of subjectivizing Being, “as if interpretation throw[s] a “significance” over what is 
nakedly objectively present”114.  
Therefore, “Heidegger does not owe us an account of ‘how nonconceptual content is 
converted into a given with conceptual content’, but rather an account of how experiential 
content, which is already conceptual – i.e. possesses the as-structure- is made explicit in 
Interpretation”115. Now our point is that, as hinted above, the relation between explicitness and 
implicitness, which is illustrated most clearly both in handiness and in the relation between 
Understanding and Interpretation, corresponds to the concealment/unconcealment pair in 
Heidegger’s later thought. But how is this relation to be thought? Looking at Being and Time 
with one eye while directing the other towards Heidegger’s later thought, we can say that the 
problem of Being and Time is how to think handiness as implicit in Besorgen, or how to think 
Interpretation as implicitly present in Understanding. This implicitness speaks about the openness 
of Being, the Transcendence of Dasein. It is a problem of thinking concealment as concealment 
as opposed to the possible concealment of concealment that Being and Time is in danger of 
executing. To map it on Lacanian terminology, ‘concealment as concealment’ requires veiling 
and, to a certain extent, ignorance. The semblance of the big Other can only subsist as a mystery. 
On the other hand, concealment of concealment is the result of a predisposition towards 
disclosure. Or again, in the words of Lacan, those who refuse to be duped by jouissance err the 
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most. Heidegger says we always cope with beings as beings. If this statement is to be more than 
just a platitude, then in order for it to be thought properly, that is in order for the thinking of 
Being to stand in the openness of Being and face-to-face with it, thinking must achieve the “leap 
into the abyss” Heidegger would later speak of. “We cope with beings as beings”. Yes, in our 
dealings an understanding of Being must be that which allows us to disclose beings. But does 
that mean that because we experience beings, it follows that we must experience Being? 
Heidegger has a wonderful passage in Contributions to Philosophy: 
From where does the intimation and representation of be-ing come from? From 
the experience of beings, one happily responds... Does the experience of a being 
continue to be the only occasion, the occasion, of that representing of be-ing; or 
be-ing as beingness immediately taken up “on” and “in” a being? Moreover, we 
immediately face the often asked question: How is one capable of experiencing a 
being as a being without knowing of be-ing?116  
Heidegger radically questions the authority of the “experience of beings” as a path 
towards ‘experiencing Being’. Heidegger in the same passage further writes: “ Or does man’s 
intimation of be-ing come precisely not from a being but rather from that alone which has equal 
rank with be-ing- because it continues to belong to being- from the nothing?” The leap into the 
open region of be-ing is taken here to be the priority in thinking Be-ing; it is this relation with the 
nothing that provides concealment, which is to say provides the attunement of thinking towards, 
and face-to-face with, being. 
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2.3 Conclusion  
 
The way we explicated the problematic nature of Being and Time points to the need for b 
a void, a nothing, behind what is phenomenologically given in order for the being-there to be 
sustained. Lacan says, “being-there is not nothing, it is attributed to the object that is a”117. 
Heidegger’s short-circuiting between the ontological truth of being and its positive embodiment 
in concrete social existence is reflected in Being and Time as a short-circuit between the 
encounter of being and the ontical mode of readiness-to-hand. Heidegger could not give an 
account of how the always already implicit understanding of being becomes interpretation 
because once we have interpretation, we have a fantasy. It is startling how Heidegger wanted the 
as-structure to be ontologically determinative but failed to see how such a proposal would turn 
the Umwelt into a chain of signifiers. One can go further: the Umwelt becomes a chain of 
signifiers in the service of the jouissance of whoever makes use of it. What he calls contextual 
involvement can only be relevant for a jouissance of being on the basis of a name of the father, 
that is, of a big Other that subsists independently of the act of speech. 
In other words, the transcendental position was vulnerable to being compromised, 
relativized, so to speak. The freedom which the thinking of being must give us through 
transcendental reflection on ontological difference, that being is transcendental to every being 
(entity), was threatened by the very articulation of that difference. Since in Being and Time 
entities were discovered not in isolation, but only in their referential context, a relativization of 
the ego-ideal in the misrecognition of imaginary identification can only turn the world into 
worldliness, in other words, the hammer, the nail, the log, the cottage, the shelter, into a series of 
metonymic signifiers in-which, with-which, in-order-to. Heidegger retreated from this abyss 
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quickly and blamed everything on transcendental philosophy and its a priori apparatus. One 
might say the a priori in early Heidegger functioned as a guarantor that would establish the link 
between understanding of being and the way this understanding is articulated in language.  This 
move is strictly homologous with that of Lacan of the 1950’s, for whom there was a big Other 
that guaranteed the integration of symptoms into an already existing meta-language. 
Heidegger blamed everything on the Leibnizian heritage of justification and the principle 
of sufficient reason, and thus abandoned all a priori thinking as missing the essence of being, 
one might say a thinking that relativizes the spontaneity of the transcendental position in which 
beings are encountered as beings. Lacan’s solution was to take the symbolic to the limit, and take 
justification as already included in everything human beings do and say by virtue of being beings 
of language. The search for the ground (Grund) is not only the task of the reflecting thinker who 
is engaged in the thinking of being, but rather because of the inconsistency of language (that 
language is non-all) all speaking beings justify their behaviour by virtue of semblance of a big 
Other. The proximity of the real as a result of the failure of the Oedipus complex is what makes 
language lose its consistency. In order for language to have the desired consistency, the subject 
must strive to veil the fact that it is non-all by recourse to fantasy. This is how individual speech 
and universal language become dissociated, no doubt precariously and in a fleeting way, in order 
for the subject to attain his place and his consistency. In other words, speaking beings have to 
unconsciously justify their acts precisely because they are not in this world, which is to say, since 
world for Lacan is nothing but the fantasy according to which thought sustains itself, they are not 
identical with their symbolic mandates, with their symbolic titles.  
There is another dimension that appears between the brute reality and our symbolic 
commitments, the dimension of death drive. There is no meta-language does not mean that we 
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are prisoners of our own solipsistic egos, that everything we say is utterly meaningless since 
there cannot be any locus that guarantees the referential relation to something outside of us. That 
there is no meta-language means precisely that no enunciated statement can escape being 
compromised by its very position of enunciation. The unconscious as a rupture in discourse is the 
way the speaking being engages in grounding and abgrounding the symbolic game. 
The way the indication of the sign to the referential totality already bears witness to a 
failure in schematism in Being and Time, a failure in how language should grasp the real. The 
death drive is precisely that the speaking being lives, first and foremost, primordially, in a chain 
of signifiers, in worldliness as a chain of signifiers, seeking satisfaction in its repetitive circuit. It 
was this radical dimension that Heidegger retreated from. The stage in schematism is set, as it 
were, for the chain of signifiers to work on its own, an automaton chain of repetition. In other 
words, the practical comportments of Dasein, as ultimately directed by an implicit understanding 
of being turned out to be nothing but a protection against a libidinal enjoyment, or rather, a 
protection against a real core of repetition.  
Therefore, the gap is not between the observer and the heedfulness, but rather between 
heedfulness as engaged towards a goal, and its real repetitive core, in a nutshell, a chain of 
signifiers that functions as if by itself. In the section on schematism, the eternal core of the death 
drive appears as if by itself, through language, and despite Heidegger's intention, where, a real 
spectral of beyond life apparition makes itself manifest: the hammer hammers, the sign indicates, 
in turning the hammer to occupy nothing by the function of the signifier in representing the 
subject for another signifier. From this vortex of enjoyment of the signifier, there is no choice, 
simply because there is no world; the horizon of interpretation that allows us a distance is not 
simply present. This is how the fundamental phantasy is traversed, when one goes to the end 
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through the symbolic. One must thus confront the enigmatic desire of the Other: through the 
jouissance of the chain of signifiers, one must uncover the signifier of desire (the phallus). In 
order to claim that the Other is not desiring would mean that there is an a priori relation between 
understanding and being (that is, that S1 cannot be incorporated into the production of 
knowledge). The desire of the Other is already there, answered, in an a priori perfection. It is a 
previous freeing, a secure link. Lacan’s move was rather from the a priori perfect, to the future 
perfect: I will have been. In Seminar XI, Lacan strips Trieb, the drive, from any strife after a pre-
symbolic satisfaction. They are constructed by and within the symbolic order. Consequently, 
their real source of jouissance cannot be a return to the inanimate, but purely in their repetitive 
movement.  Beyond the two classical grammatical voices of the drive (active and passive), Lacan 
defines a middle voice, the reflexive “se faire”. Besides “to see” and “to be seen”, the drive also 
returns to itself: “to make oneself be seen”. The drive completes its circuit only in this third voice 
when a new subject appears.  
Instead of a big Other in which everything can be already secured (one cannot speak of 
language without a metalanguage), we get the true formula that will not reduce ecstatic 
temporality to a simple diachrony of desire: I will have been, where what is actualized is not 
simply futuristic hidden potentialities (this is the diachrony of desire), but rather the past itself. 
This is why one could say that in interpreting Being and Time as still within the metaphysical 
horizon of the subject (understood as ego) Heidegger attempted to achieve a short circuit in 
running away from the diachrony of desire. It is the vortex of desire that is bound to reduce the 
world to worldliness. There is no such thing as previous freeing, and Heidegger saw this in 
Contribution to Philosophy. Yet he still held tenaciously to pre-Socratic thought as a sign of a 
non-corrupt kernel of thinking. It is, in fact, the subject himself that must bear the responsibility 
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for ontological difference, and at each stage, as it were, the subject previously re-frees entities. In 
other words, the subject of the unconscious reconstitutes what ontological difference means 
because of the immanent encounter between life and death that goes by the name of the death 
drive. Unlike being-towards-death, the death drive is not an impossible experience even though it 
stems from a point of impossible enunciation. The repetitive structure of the drive is what allows 
us to experience the point where life insists beyond whatever aim may be ascribed to it.  That 
this insistence of life is prior to any understanding of being is the reason why the subject, at each 
stage, projects a newly configured semblance of the symbolic order in which something like 
being can emerge.   
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Chapter 3 
The letter and the sinthome 
 
 
Writing comes only in the wake of a reading. “For it is only by taking interpretation to 
the letter that it will ultimately be able to pass to a limit which can only be crossed when it 
reverses itself in effects of creation”118. What was read in Being and Time was a mapping of the 
traces of parasitic jouissance, a reading that demands that one does not disavow, but instead 
reads to the letter.  
 
 
3.1 From Pure Desire to Drive 
 
Traversing the fantasy is no longer the final word in psychoanalysis. The intervention of 
the letter as a messenger of the real of jouissance is inserted after mapping out the network of 
knowledge, S2. This is the shift Lacan anticipated in Seminar XI: “After the mapping of the 
subject in relation to a, the experience of the fundamental fantasy becomes the drive”119. Alenka 
Zupančič, for example, in her Lacanian reading of Kantian ethics, illustrates the mapping of 
fantasy as the realization that there is no ultimate cause behind the realm of phenomenal 
causality120. This is what it means to say the big Other does not exist. Yet, this already assumes 
an existence of a semblance of an Other, in the form of a network of phenomenal causality, 
against which the subject can come face-to-face with his object cause of desire as the ultimate 
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lack of being. This is indeed the mechanism for the subject of desire before realizing there is no 
cause behind the causes; the subject in that position assumed a complete big Other. The need for 
the letter as a writing of the real certainly stems from the deadlock formulated by the subject of 
the drive, insofar as for the latter there is no name-of-the-father that could even guarantee the 
semblance of an Other, even if that Other is taken to be natural law, since for Lacan, thought and 
being are based on language. It certainly does not make sense to say that for Joyce, as he was 
writing, such an Other existed. 
Thus the dissociation of a from S(A) proved to be not an easy task. There is a tendency in 
the Slovenian school of analysis to evoke the ego-ideal as a virtual point that will liberate the 
subject from his morbid relation to object a in the vortex of the drive121. An example of this, is 
the articulation of the Hegelian opposition between Reason and Understanding as the former 
being the virtual point from where understanding sees itself, as incomplete, inadequate. No doubt 
this is indispensable in confronting the lack of the Other. Lacan’s articulation of the sinthome, 
however, can be seen as a more basic move that provides support for the subject’s topology, and 
consequently, as a support for thinking when the consequences of the non-existence of the Other 
are given their full import. 
Perhaps one can even venture to suggest the existence of structural homologies between 
the thinking of being Heidegger attempts to put forth and Lacan’s articulation of pure desire in 
Seminar VII. Consequently, Lacan’s failure to distinguish such pure desire (in its infinite 
measure) from the superegoic function of real-izing the symbolic would also be mapped on 
Being and Time in the antagonism above. “Do not compromise your desire” is a command, and 
as such an injunction to enjoy. That is why Lacan’s later theorization of jouissance is formulated 
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in the neologism of joui-sans. I believe that the encounter with beings as beings (pure desire- 
“being as a lack of being”122) and its correlative superegoic command, which comes in the form 
of schematism (i.e. relativization of the transcendental ego) in worldliness as a chain of 
signifiers, is equivalent to pure desire as the desire of the analyst, as an embodiment of the whole 
metonymy of desire in an object, and the Sado-Kantian absolute law. One can even find 
homology of the infinite measure of Antigone’s desire in Heidegger. For example, he writes in 
What is metaphysics?: “Think of a chemical oxidation on Mars and of an elephant in the Indian 
Jungle”. Here there is an attempt to invoke an infinite measure as that which will release thinking 
into the realm of being as being. Just as Antigone’s desire needed a measure, a big Other, a 
background in order to appear (“the children I will not have, etc.”), the thinking of being needs a 
measure in the form of a transcendentally constituted reality of objects, in other words, it 
depends on a transcendental ego that can only be implicated, relativized. The difference, of 
course, between Antigone’s evocation of the infinite measure and Heidegger’s own is that the 
former is a subject who, although sublime for us, “does not experience the sublime herself”123. If 
Antigone does move the storms of, why not, the thinking of being in us, it is precisely because 
we observe her from a safe distance. We can now see the import the later Luke Thurston 
speculates Lacan saw in Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, where the author 
attempts to self-nominate God and the universe in a series of repetitive and logical rhythms 
“culminating in a tautological loop”124. It is a self-inscription of a new distance, a new 
structuring subjectivity. 
                                               
122 Chiesa, Subjectivity and Otherness, 181. 
 
123 Zupančič, Ethics of the Real, 253. 
 
124 Luke Thurston, “Joycean Topology,” Lacan: Topologically Speaking, 315.  
 
61 
 
 
3.2 Topology 
            I would like to qualify the above reading of Being and Time as a reading, the function of 
which, is to map out the network of signifiers in order to reach the limit. The true limit, is of 
course, a repetitive chain of signifiers that cannot be produced in a scholarly essay. We can only 
stop at the verge of it. My reading is an attempt to anchor it in the real, to trace the contours of 
being of the speaking subject. Its failure, however, is not without merit, since it proved “the 
apparent” necessity of the phallus. A jouissance of the idiot, no doubt, but one at least in 
accordance with Heidegger’s formula “Dasein is always mine”. It is here that the intervention of 
topology in the knots of jouissance is relevant. One’s particular real must be supported by one’s 
own re-invention of the ego. The ego is the sinthome125. As Milovanovic explains, “locating the 
moi (Lacan’s imaginary ego)” at the intersection of the real, symbolic, and the imaginary can 
have the function of supporting the Borromean knot without recourse to the castrating father. 
This should not deceive us into thinking that Lacan in reverting back to the imaginary domain as 
a locus of sense production. Whereas meaning is produced at the intersection of the symbolic and 
the imaginary, the sinthome articulates a new relation to a real that is completely missed by the 
symbolic. The sinthome’s affinity to the imaginary is a new elaboration of the old fact that the 
real cannot be thought without the imaginary. It is thus a point of intersection that can allow new 
discourses to be reproduced, or at least can re-imagine the configuration of current discourses 
that depend on the symbolic father.  
In short, a reading, since it is based on the jouissance of whoever makes use of it, traces 
out what Lacan calls parasitic jouissance in so far as it is the function of being that superimposes 
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the semblance and S(A)126. Whereas previously the concept of the semblance was specific in 
Lacan’s teaching, denoting an envelope of object a, in his last teaching period, as Russell Grigg 
contends, “had come to include just about everything that had been previously distinguished, and 
this is a problem. Language, the Other, the Name-of-the-Father, the phallus, all come to be 
regarded as semblants”127. Thus, one may read the sinthome as a self-nomination of semblants, a 
way to give consistency to the subject of the drive. It simulates a symbolic order by virtue of the 
name taking the place of the name-of-the-father. 
 A meditation on being can only be “successful” if it is guarded by a master signifier. 
This is the only way it can afford a disavowed disjunction between a and S(A). In other words, 
only a master signifier can allow the subject to lop off the predicate and say being is: 
“Everything that has been said about being assumes that one can refuse the predicate and say 
‘man is’…without saying what”128. This, I take it, is because thought is based on language, and 
language, as Lacan says, “brings with it considerable inertia”129. The inertia of the impossibility 
of sexual relation as that which “does not stop not being written”130 is what confers on thought, 
or more precisely on meditation on being, its annihilating nature: “ As for the meditation on 
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being that reaches its culmination in the thought of Heidegger, it restores to being itself that 
power of annihilation”131 
The tyranny of the superego is not something that can be easily done away with, if it ever 
can. Its imperative, “Enjoy!”, is a correlate of castration, “the latter being the sign with which an 
avowal dresses itself up, the avowal that jouissance of the Other, of the body of the Other, is 
promoted only on the basis of infinity”132.  The impossibility of inscribing the sexual link in the 
Other “does not stop not being written”; in other words, the real has agency and insistence and is 
not something like the Kantian noumena. As a result, the imperative to enjoy, to “not stop 
writing it”, is what follows. This is the paradox of the Freudian death drive: that the only way for 
desiring beings to deal with impossibility is to necessarily keep trying to make it possible, i.e. to 
“succeed in making it fail”133. That is to say, impossibility engenders necessity, and further, a 
necessity that is infinite only because it is related to this or that object134. This is what grants 
idiotic jouissance its particularity.  
Now we can see the necessity of what Lacan calls topology as an attempt to cipher 
jouissance and deliver the speaking being from his alienation in language so that he can see this 
latter “as something transcendent, truly transcendent”135. Hence the importance of topology for 
Lacan: in-so-far as mathemes are “transmitted integrally”, they defy meaning as much as 
possible, although in the end they are also transmitted with the help of language, but language’s 
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inertia limits our understanding of mathemes by purely linguistic means.  Thus those who 
criticize Lacan’s mathemes as unintelligible miss the point. This is their function: to illustrate the 
impossibility of the real as it approaches the symbolic. It is precisely because of this inertia that 
the semblance of being collapses. It is inadequate. Something resists interpretation and 
integration. This is easy to see if we take Lacan’s later formulations about the subject as not 
related primarily to the symbolic but to the real.  
Topology reveals “a failure, a failure of logic to suture the subject of science”136, a failure 
of the symbolic to remain consistent as the real approaches. For Lacan, it appears that 
philosophical discourse in general tends to obfuscate this failure by means of the function of 
being. “Thought is on the winning side” as long as the effects of speech qua “dit-mension,” the 
mansion where truth resides, as a knot, a relation between jouissance and knowledge, is not 
revealed. As opposed to history as meaning, Lacan’s conception of history is a relay-operation of 
jouissance that is carried by the letter. Consequently, what concerns analytic discourse is nothing 
but the relation between and among other discourses, and the social links the discourses produce. 
For example, Lacan’s famous seminar on Poe’s “The Purloined Letter,” goes beyond the merely 
intersubjective structures to explore how one cannot assume a position in the symbolic without 
an identification and a relation with others. In fact, one could say that it was precisely to get out 
of such an intersubjective situation that the letter was formulated. Since, ‘pure’ desire in Seminar 
VII is effected by other subjects’ desires, the letter as a writing that is not dependent on what is 
read (or one can say, on what is said in what is heard) comes to have its mediating value. What is 
relayed in history, as conjured trick, takes place in accordance with the letter; in other words, in 
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accordance with unconscious knowledge, not in so far as it takes its orientation from being, but 
in so far as it takes it from the Other qua hole.  
3.3 The Letter 
 
The necessary interpretation of Freud that saved that father is, according to Lacan, that 
only the murder of the son would establish the religion of grace137. The murder of the son was a 
negation of the exception, of the function of the father that sustained castration. But this saved 
the father, and the ethics and the import of psychoanalysis is how to do without him. The 
Borromean knot was thus Lacan’s wager that it might come to replace the father and the 
identification he entraps the subject with, i.e. the unary trait, with a writing of the real. The 
consequences of the non-existence of the Other we elaborated above entail the necessity that this 
new writing must “replace the imaginary consistency [the subject] derives from the father as 
bearer of castration”138. The fact that the imaginary is what is at stake in the late Lacan is not 
new. We saw his reading of the interpretation Socrates gives to Alcibiades in order to erect his 
image as desiring. What is new is that now the imaginary is mapped in relation to the drive, and 
with this mapping comes a new articulation of the subject in his relation to object a. 
The impossibility of sexual relation, and it is an impossibility with agency since “it 
doesn’t stop being not written”, is what makes the real always return to the same place. Late 
Lacan conceptualizes the letter as the carrier of a bit of the real on its back, in its coupling with 
the signifier.139 Whereas the signifier consists of the sense of articulated language, the letter is 
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what knots the body to the jouissance of the unconscious140. As Philip Dravers puts it, “from the 
perspective of the later Lacan, we can say that what is at stake in a reading of the letter is 
ultimately the jouissance of whoever makes use of it, and this is beyond the question of 
signification that comes to be attached to it”141. This is how the letter traces the contours of being 
for the subject. In the seminar on “The Purloined Letter,” Lacan says apropos of the characters of 
the story that “for each of them the letter is his unconscious”142 Whereas in the early Lacan the 
letter was perceived to be entirely identical with the signifier, its later dissociation was clearly a 
consequence of attempting to articulate the subject’s “stuckness” in the drive.  
Meaning, as Lacan says in Seminar XX, is based on a semblance. Therefore, an alienating 
imaginary identification is necessary to bar the subject in order for articulated language to be 
read. What punctuates a sentence is the ego-ideal, a unary trait that incarnates the master 
signifier in the unconscious. It is on the basis of such alienation that the subject can assume his 
sexual function. To articulate a topology that will not depend on such an identification, therefore, 
means we are left with language and the object cause of desire as a real void. Hence Lacan’s 
reduction of the symptom as the couple: signifier-letter. “Writing, the letter, is in the Real, and 
the signifier is in the symbolic”143. The letter is what insists, it is the instance of jouissance 
whose primary structure is a “repetition of the unary trait… as an attempt to master [the trauma] 
that was imposed in the initial encounter”144. Dravers points out the way the letter goes on its 
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way, disregarding what is read, by virtue of equivocation in speech145. The jouissance that the 
letter carries with it by virtue of the impossibility of the sexual relation is the one that will be 
used to effect a separation between the letter and the signifier.  
Alienation, then, is the attempt to anchor the phallus in the real, or alternatively, S1 in 
what is produced as knowledge S2. Given the decline of the function of the father, one of the 
goals of analysis becomes to effectuate a savoir-faire of each individual person, producing the 
know-how to manage one’s symptom. Whereas previously Lacan defined the letter as the split 
subject, later the letter became S1, “the letter of the master signifier, insofar as it carries it in its 
envelope”146. Whatever the semblance of being, the letter arrives to its destination. Idiotic 
jouissance can only repeat itself “via the production of a surplus-enjoyment”147. Here we see a 
difference in attitude between Lacan and Heidegger. The latter focused on finitude, on passivity, 
whereas for Lacan, in so far as the deadlock of the drive is concerned, what is needed is the 
“cease of castration as a possibility”148. Hence the need for a new structuring of imaginary 
identification, one based on active writing, on a rejection of castration, that will not repeat itself 
by virtue of the alienation in the primary signifier. To be clear, this rejection of castration will 
not change anything of the impossibility of sexual relation. It is an attempt to produce another 
jouissance that has nothing to do with sex. 
 This is how a disjunction that may have more success in revealing language’s 
transcendence may be effected. We have seen that one of the consequences of the non-existence 
                                               
145 Ibid. 
 
146 Quoted in Ibid, 228. 
 
147 Ibid, 229. 
 
148 Ibid, 231. 
 
68 
 
of the big Other is the impossibility to distinguish between individual speech and language. This 
is the point at which the intervention through the letter comes in, an intervention that is particular 
to each subject’s symptom, one that traces his or her jouissance in order to provide a home for a 
jouissance that is not phallic. In other words, one writes one’s real, with the letter.  
 The Letter is that which “divides knowledge and jouissance, while knotting them 
together in the margins”149. It is that which makes “the verisimilitude supposed of fiction” 
something other than “the vanity of a misplaced mimetism”150. In other words, the letter is what 
holds together the semblances of fiction, the symbolic. Hence the importance of the question of 
writing: its function is to effect a knotting between knowledge and speech in the absence of a 
castrating other. As Dravers explains, for Lacan there is an initial reading, a reading whose 
elementary structure is that of repetition. That is to say, it is a repetition of the jouissance of the 
subject’s initial trauma of the encounter with language. What is written in this repetition is the 
‘apparent’ necessity of the phallus in so far as “it does not stop being written”. But as Lacan 
explains, this necessity is only apparent; it is made contingent by the impossibility of sexual 
relation “that which doesn’t stop being not written”. It is in relation to this impossibility that 
metaphor takes its power in making the speaking subject encounter language as something 
transcendent. In the absence of a big Other, the sinthome comes in as a writing that has object a 
as its reference. Yet, the sinthome is posited as that One which eludes any residue of meaning 
that object a possesses. Freud already questioned the effect of analysis against “the primal 
addiction”, masturbation, in hysterics. The status of our contemporary social discourse, however, 
is different from that of Freud’s time. Reality is more precarious than ever. It is here that Lacan 
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intervenes with a form of writing whose aim is to self-clothe the subject with a new imaginary 
that completely evades the correlation of causality that is characteristic of the symbolic order.  
That is why what Lacan calls writing of the real cannot be compared on any 
deconstructive writing precisely because the latter does not accept the impossibility of sexual 
relation, and merely defers it. Lacan writes that one can use such writings only on the condition 
of accepting the non-existence of the big Other. Historicist discourses have a function similar to 
deconstructive writing in their suspension of truth judgments. One can compare the relation 
between historicist discourses and psychoanalysis as that between psycho-therapy and 
psychoanalysis. Both ignore the jouissance involved in the text and take a hermeneutic approach. 
They are thus on the side of meaning, of the signifier. The good they do, as Lacan says in 
Television, is a good that returns to what is worse.  
 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
Today, we no longer have an Other to measure our infinite desire against. The model for 
early Lacan was a dissociation of the alienating imaginary semblance from the S(A) through an 
invitation to accept castration. For in doing so we give up our own jouissance in so far as it is 
implicated in an imaginary dimension (“Dasein is always mine”). And in doing so, we 
necessarily re-posit a big Other, but this time it can only be, according to Lacan, incomplete, 
inconsistent, not-all. In giving up jouissance of the exception, which is nothing but the 
consequence of the command of the superego in its formal structure, the drive which attempts to 
locate das Ding in the heart of reality, we regain it (i.e. jouissance) on another level, at the level 
of the not-all of the symbolic151. 
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When the consequences of the non-existence of the big Other assumed their full weight, 
Lacan saw the need to theorize it at a more basic psychic level, at the level of the sinthome in 
order to combat the symptom. That madness is the greatest danger that looms over mankind is 
not new. Hegel took refuge in memory and in theorizing about the stages of human life. The 
function of such a theorizing is to re-create a semblance of the big Other. One can even venture 
to posit similar theorization for the Lacanian discourse. 
In the course of the human life, the subject is indeed thrown into an already existing big 
Other, or so it seems. Pure desire can only emerge against this background; the background of a 
belief that an already existing big Other is there. This is how its infinity is a matter of 
measurement, a contrast, say, between the infinity of the subject’s desire and the seemingly 
orderly, systematic way of das Man. Being-towards-death is actually achievable only through 
such a distance, only through an image erected in place of the Thing. The death drive is the urge 
to be the Thing itself; it drives towards the hole in the real. Under the light of the necessity of the 
big Other to release pure desire, we should read Freud’s statement “I cannot a see more 
important need for the child than the father”. That the father is already a dead father is not a 
statement of an “a priori perfect”, but rather, his status is that, as Lacan says, “he will have been 
killed”152, a future perfect. But that “he will have been killed” cannot mean that he is always 
already dead, in a sense of an a priori perfect. 
Thus traversing the fantasy can only repeat itself. First pure desire (not real-izing it yet, 
but simply once an image is erected as embodying the fact that desire will always be dissatisfied, 
structurally)  is given to the subject, and its consequence that no Other of the Other, i.e. no 
transcendent Other is there to guarantee the consistency of reality. Yet, and this is crucial, it is 
only given against a background of some big Other, a universal, yet concealed, name of the 
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father that sustains all those other desiring beings who just have no clue (i.e. whose desires are 
arrested in this or that object). The S(A) as lacking is here still distinguished from the treasury of 
signifiers. The second choice sets in when the superegoic command, which is inherent in any 
signifying network, forces the subject to will nothingness, as it were. In Freud’s often repeated 
words, ‘the gods can turn into demons’. An urge to certainty (to enjoy), to know (to enjoy), for 
oneself, behind the concealed no-of-the-father, what the real father enjoys. The enjoyment of the 
real father was an obsession of Socrates. For Lacan, Socrates wanted to know how ‘hotness 
combines with coldness without pushing the essence of hotness to one side and coldness to the 
other’- in other words, a certainty after the pure signifier. If we take the no-of-the-father as a 
somewhat similar structure to the transcendental ego, no wonder the subject’s desire, when the 
death drive sets in, that is, when being-towards-death is no longer an option, turns Heidegger’s 
world into worldliness, into a chain of signifiers. This is also the point at which, I think, a 
difference must be located between the two statements “there is no Other of the Other”, and 
“there is no big Other”. One can say, provisionally, there is Other of the Other in pure desire, that 
there is no Cause of the series of causality in the phenomenal realm. Yet this already presupposes 
a series of causality, i.e., it presupposes an Other, in a word, transcendence. The statement “the 
big Other does not exist” is due to the impossibility of distinguishing between speech at the 
individual level and language at a universal level. How can one not fall back into a destructive 
imaginary dyad with the (m)Other- and thus fails to see both (the subject and the other)?  
Yet something insists. It is the real that holes the symbolic. That is why “Lacan reminds 
those who read him that it is not enough to simply evoke the void and flood it with jouissance, 
for one must also know how to locate it and operate upon the structure that encloses it in order to 
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create a new topological consistency to support the subject’s relation to jouissance”153. The letter 
allows the cut of the unconscious to be isolated from the semblance that covers it. If we have 
defined an alienating reading that is based on the coalescence of a with S(A), in short, based on 
phallic jouissance, then such a reading is what comes before a writing of the knot. In pushing this 
insight to its logical conclusion, what will remain but the necessity (life or death) to replace it 
with a form of writing that goes beyond poetry and metaphor? It is the function of the letter to 
replace the phallic topology of the subject with a new one that re-structures his relation to 
jouissance. One could say that the inspiration for articulating the sinthome originates from the 
impetus of the death drive as that which forces the subject to begin from the beginning again. 
Since the sinthome is not a function of meaning, since it does not produce an unconscious 
knowledge in relation to a master signifier, it is not capable of being interpreted like object a, or 
traversed like fantasy. The contemporary subject’s subjugation to scientific gadgets certainly 
have the effect of doing away with the impossible, an effect which is also brought about by 
scientific discourse since it reduces all knowledge to known knowledge. This lack of 
confrontation with the real can only produce “the last man” who is completely foreclosed from 
historical experience. This is because the man who only wants to desire the next thing cannot 
possibly have any relation to his jouissance. 
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